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Abstract
This thesis explores topics in financial intermediation and macro-finance. In the first
chapter, my co-authors and I analyse the structure of the UK repo market using a
novel dataset. We estimate the extent of collateral rehypothecation, and address the
question of which variables determine haircuts using transaction-level data. We find
that collateral rating and transaction maturity have first order of importance in setting
haircuts. Banks charge higher haircuts when they transact with non-bank institutions
even after controlling for measures of counterparty risk. We examine the structure of
the repo market network and we find out that banks with higher centrality measures
ask for more haircuts on reverse repos and pay lower haircuts on repos.
In the second chapter, I study the real effects of benchmarking in fund manage-
ment industry in a general equilibrium model where stocks of productive sectors are
traded in a competitive equity market. Investors delegate their portfolio decisions
to managers whose performance is benchmarked against an index. Managers hedge
themselves by tilting their portfolio toward the index which increases the demand and
price of the stocks that feature prominently in the index. In equilibrium there is an
inefficient shift towards extreme states in which big sectors dominate the economy. I
show that in presence of benchmarking, index inclusion is preceded by a rise in firm’s
investment rate relative to its capital stock.
In the third chapter, I examine balance sheet recessions in a general equilibrium
model where agents have heterogeneous beliefs about future technology growth. I
show a channel which describes the risk concentration through belief dispersion rather
than ad-hoc constraints on aggregate risk sharing. Endogenous stochastic consump-
tion volatility arises from constant fundamental volatility. I study the role of static
vis-à-vis dynamic disagreement and examine the effect of financing constraints on the
equilibrium when there is belief dispersion among agents.
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Chapter 1
The Repo Market and the
Determinants of Haircuts
Abstract
We analyse the structure of the UK repo market using a regulatory dataset that cov-
ers about 70% of this market. We examine the maturity structure, collateral types
and different counterparty types that engage in this market and estimate the extent of
collateral rehypothecation by the banks. We address the question of what variables de-
termine haircuts using transaction-level data. We find that collateral rating and trans-
action maturity have first order importance in setting haircuts. Banks charge higher
haircuts when they transact with non-bank institutions. In particular, hedge funds
as borrowers receive a significantly higher haircut even after controlling for measures
of counterparty risk. We find that larger borrowers with higher ratings receive lower
haircuts, but this effect can be overshadowed by collateral quality, because weaker
borrowers try to use higher quality collateral to receive a lower haircut. Finally, we
examine the structure and attributes of the repo market network and assess if the net-
work structure has an influence over haircuts. We observe that the banks with higher
centrality measures ask for more haircuts on reverse repos and pay lower haircuts on
repos.
1.1 Introduction
The repurchase agreement (repo) market is a major tool for short-term funding of
financial institutions. Although there is no definitive data about the size of this mar-
ket, the International Capital Market Association suggests that the value of the global
commercial market can be up to €15 trillion (International Capital Market Asso-
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ciation, 2013). During the recent financial crisis repo markets experienced various
disruptions and potentially contributed to the severity of the crisis. For example
Copeland et al. (2010) provide evidence that shows that during the days prior to
bankruptcy, the amount of collateral Lehman Brothers financed in tri-party repo fell
drastically. Gorton and Metrick (2012) argue that the repo market experienced a run
during the crisis, manifested in rise of haircuts, which exacerbated the crisis.
Although using collateral has stabilising effects for individual lenders, it may ag-
gravate systemic risk by intensifying the correlation between asset prices and fund-
ing costs. This is highlighted by Valderrama (2010), who shows, that when a lender
deleverages its reverse repo contracts in face of a liquidity shock, it can cause a wave
of contagion along a chain of market players. Arrival of new information about the
quality of assets used as collateral can change the asset prices dramatically and cause a
systemic event in the repo market. Another type of disruption happens when lenders
respond to the perceived creditworthiness of a counterparty (Adrian et al., 2013).
Given the importance of the repo market and its contribution to the systemic risk
of the financial system—especially in the wake of the recent crisis—there is ample in-
terest in better understanding and monitoring it from academics, policy makers and
members of the public. However, as Adrian et al. (2013) indicate in their analysis of
the data requirements for screening repo and securities markets, existing data sources
are incomplete and there is a need for a more inclusive data collection from both
academic and policy-making perspectives. In particular, they enumerate six impor-
tant characteristics of repo trades that need to be gathered at the firm level: principal
amount, interest rate, collateral, haircut, tenor, and counterparty.
Public sources providing information on the aforementioned data items at dis-
aggregated level are very limited. Adrian et al. (2013) provide an overview of the
sources that provide information for the US repo market and conclude that, though
some sources provide data on interest rates and values used in repo trades, very little
is known about haircuts, tenor and counterparties.
Systemic importance of the repo market on one hand and shortage of micro-data
on the other hand prompted the UK regulator to require banks to disclose transaction-
level data on their repo books. We were given the opportunity to work with this
regulatory dataset to analyse the structure of the UK repo market. Among the six
important trade characteristics required to generate an inclusive picture of the repo
market discussed above, we have access to all at trade level, but repo rates. We examine
the maturity structure, collateral types and different counterparty types that engage
in this market and estimate the extent of collateral rehypothecation by the reporting
banks. Due to the importance of haircuts and the fact that they control the amount
of inside liquidity that shadow banking system can generate, we try to answer the
question of what variables determine haircuts using transaction-level data. We also
examine the structure and attributes of the repo market network and assess if the
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network structure has an influence on haircuts.
1.1.1 Background Information on Repurchase Agreements
A repurchase agreement is the simultaneous sale and forward agreement to repurchase
of securities at a specific price, at a future date (Duffie, 1996). In effect a repo is a
collateralised loan, where the underlying security serves the collateral role. The party
who borrows cash and delivers collateral is said to be doing a repo, and the party who
lends cash and receives collateral is doing a reverse repo. The difference between the
original loan value and the repayment specifies the repo rate. The haircut or margin
on the other hand is determined by the difference between the loan and collateral
value. Usually the borrower has to post collateral in excess of the notional amount,
and the haircut is defined as h = 1−F /C with collateral value C and notional amount
F (Krishnamurthy et al., 2014). For example, if a borrower receives $98 against $100
value of collateral, the haircut is 2%.
In Europe, the legal title to the collateral is transferred to the cash lender by an
outright sale. In the US, this is not the case, but the repo collateral is not subject to
an automatic stay and can be sold by the lender should the borrower defaults (Inter-
national Capital Market Association, 2013).
Repurchase agreements are broadly classified in two categories. Tri-party repo is
a transaction for which post-trade services like collateral management (e.g. selection,
valuation, and verifying eligibility criteria), payment, margining, etc. are outsourced
to a third-party agent which is a custodian bank.1 A tri-party agent settles the repos
on its book, but in a bilateral repo settlement usually occurs on a delivery versus
payment basis, and the cash lender must have back-office capabilities to receive and
manage the collateral (Adrian et al., 2013).
A growing number of repos are cleared via central (clearing) counterparties (CCPs).
CCPs place themselves between the two sides of a trade, leading to a less complex web
of exposures (Rehlon and Nixon, 2013). They provide benefits such as multilateral
netting and facilities to manage member defaults in an orderly manner, but can also
pose systemic risks to the financial system. CCPs always receive a haircut, whether
in a reverse repo or repo. So banks doing a reverse repo with a CCP will need to give
a haircut, which amounts to a negative value for haircut.
1.1.2 Literature on Repurchase Agreements
The financial crisis rekindled interest in the theoretical and empirical study of the
short-term funding market. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) model the link be-
1There are two tri-party agents in the US, Bank of New York Mellon and JP Morgan. In Europe, the
main tri-party agents are Clearstream, Euroclear, Bank of New York Mellon, JP Morgan, and SegaInter-
Settle.
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tween traders’ funding liquidity—i.e. their capital and margin requirements—and the
assets’ market liquidity, and show how rising haircuts can have destabilising effects on
financial markets and cause a margin spiral. Jurek and Stafford (2011) develop a static
model for the characterisation of margins and rates in collateralised lending markets.
In their framework, haircut protects lenders from changes in the liquidation value of
collateral. Spreads and margins for assets are expected to move with each other and
proxy for the aggregate risk. Securities that have quickly declining recovery values
will be financed at higher rates and haircuts, and will respond more strongly in volatile
market conditions. Dang et al. (2011) explain the existence of haircuts by sequential
transactions and the information asymmetry between agents in trading chains. Hair-
cuts exist to protect a lender who may need to sell the collateral in case of borrower
default, facing the possibility of adverse selection. Based on their theory, the haircut
size should depend on the default probability of the borrower, the liquidity needs of
the lender, the default probability of the lender in a subsequent repo transaction and
the nature of the collateral. In this model a run on repo occurs when information-
insensitive collateral asset becomes information sensitive. Rytchkov (2009) studies
time-varying margin requirements in a dynamic setup. Acharya et al. (2011) model
freezes in the market for short-term financing in form of sudden collapse in debt ca-
pacity of collateral in an information-theoretic framework.
The empirical studies of repurchase agreements have been mostly focused on the
US repo market. Several papers have studied developments in this market during the
financial crisis. Broadly speaking two distinct phenomena can be identified in the US
bilateral and tri-party repo markets. In the bilateral market, as argued by Gorton and
Metrick (2012), a run occurred in form of rapid increases in haircut levels. This is
further supported by multiple hedge funds failing due to margin calls (Adrian et al.,
2013). In contrast, in the tri-party market haircuts moved very little and the amount
of funding remained fairly stable, but instead, lenders refused to extend financing alto-
gether to the most troubled institutions—namely Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers
(Copeland et al., 2010). Krishnamurthy et al. (2014) argue that there indeed was a
run on tri-party market but only for non-agency MBS/ABS, which constituted a rel-
atively small and insignificant part of the short-term debt market. So in the tri-party
market, tension seemed to affect specific institutions rather than the broad collateral
classes, except maybe the private-label securitised assets (Adrian et al., 2013). Martin
et al. (2014) develop a dynamic equilibrium model and relate the differences between
the behaviour of these two markets to their microstructure. In the tri-party market,
haircuts are fixed in custodial agreements that are revised infrequently, but this is not
the case in the bilateral market.
Adrian and Shin (2010) empirically show that repo transactions have contributed
the most to the procyclical adjustments of the leverage of banks. From this perspec-
tive, rapid increase of haircuts in bilateral repos during the crisis, can also be viewed
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as (forced) deleveraging of broker-dealers (Adrian et al., 2013).
1.2 Overview of the Data
The regulatory dataset is a snapshot of the repo books of 10 banks that are major
players in the UK repo market. The total size of the repo books—the sum of repos
and reverse repos—of the 10 banks is around £1.5 trillion as at end-2012.2 According
to Financial Stability Board (2013) the UK-resident deposit-taker banks hold around
£2.1 trillion in gross repo activity on their balance sheets, so our data accounts for
around 70% of the total repo activity in this market. The majority of this activity is
with non-UK resident banks, including the activity between UK and foreign branches
of the same consolidated group, and is highly concentrated (Financial Stability Board,
2013).
Each of the 10 banks report their outstanding repo transactions as at end-2012,
including the gross notional, maturity, currency, and counterparty. Out of the 10
banks, only 6 banks reported data on haircuts and collaterals. The 6 banks have a
total repo book of £511 billion and 27,886 transactions.
We have supplemented this dataset with additional data about securities, counter-
parties, and the reporting banks from Datastream and Bloomberg.
In what follows we report information and results for reverse repos (REVR) and
repos (REPO) separately. This classification is from the point of view of reporting
banks, so in a reverse repo the reporting bank is lending to a counterparty, and in a
repo the reporting bank is borrowing money from a counterparty.
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 presents an overview of our dataset in terms of key variables. It
shows the breakdown of the data along four categories: maturity, currency, counter-
party type, and collateral type (Panels A, B, C, and D respectively). For each category
we report the sum of the notional amounts of deals for each subcategory in Table 1.1
and the weighted average of haircuts for each subcategory in Table 1.2. Table 1.1 also
shows the percentage of each category in terms of the notional values. The average
haircuts in Table 1.2 are weighted by the gross notional of transactions. Both values
and haircuts are reported for reverse repos and repos separately. Since repo shows
bank borrowing, we denote the repo values with negative numbers. In Panels A, B,
and C in Table 1.1 the total values are based on the data from the ten reporting banks.
The values in Panel D in Table 1.1, as well as the all the haircuts in Table 1.2 are based
on the data from the six banks that report haircut and collateral information.
Comparing the total value of reverse repos and repos shows that banks are net bor-
rowers in the repo market. They borrow more heavily in transactions with shorter
maturity. Panel A in Table 1.1 shows that most of the transactions have maturity less
2The actual reporting periods differ slightly across the banks but all are towards the end of 2012.
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than three month. It is also evident from Panel A in Table 1.2 that haircuts monoton-
ically increase with maturity both for repos and reverse repos. We can see that except
for very long maturities, the reporting banks are able to borrow at slightly lower
haircuts than they lend. This observation means that they can use the collateral they
receive in a reverse repo to obtain more funding than originally lent. A similar pat-
tern exists for different currencies, except for EUR. A potential explanation is that a
large proportion of Euro repos is against securitisation collateral, which is subject to
a higher haircut. The same does not hold for the other currencies, because most USD
securitisation business is done in the US (hence not included in the dataset) and no
securitisation market exists for other currencies.
It is worth noting that the GBP haircuts seem relatively high. This phenomenon
is driven by relatively high haircuts against UK government bonds (see Panel D in
Table 1.2). To investigate this point, we cast a closer look at contracts with sovereign
bond collateral in Table 1.5. The data suggests that higher haircuts on gilt collateral
are driven by transactions with other asset managers in reverse repos, and transactions
with government entities in repos. However, to obtain a comprehensive view of the
determinants of haircuts we will use regression analysis as described in Section 1.3.
While borrowing exceeds lending for maturities less than three month, lending
is more for transactions with three month to one year maturity. This observation
suggest that the banks conduct maturity transformation to some extent, however, for
maturities longer than one year they are still net borrowers.
Panel C in Tables 1.1 and 1.2 exhibits the breakdown based on counterparty type.
Data in this panel makes it clear that the above-mentioned haircut advantage arises
from trades with hedge funds, insurance and pension funds and other asset managers.
In the transactions with these counterparties, the banks can receive funding at sig-
nificantly lower margins than they lend. First row in Panel C describes the values
and haircuts when counterparty is another member of the reporting banks. The re-
porting banks report on a UK consolidated basis, but counterparties are reported on
a global basis. Therefore there may be discrepancies between the reverse repos and
repos with the reporting banks.
Finally, Panel D in Tables 1.1 and 1.2 shows the breakdown based on collateral
type. It displays how margins depend on the quality of collateral. For example both
repos and reverse repos for German government bonds have a low average haircut,
while haircuts for troubled European countries and securitisation are very high.
Tables 1.3 and 1.4 present a finer breakdown of the reverse repos and repos re-
spectively. Each column shows the percentage of deals (in terms of the notional value)
against different counterparty types. This information is further divided by maturity,
currency and collateral type. For example the entry in first column and first row de-
notes the percentage of the notional value in contracts with overnight maturity where
the counterparty is another reporting bank.
11
1.2.1 Collateral Rehypothecation
An important aspect of the repo market is rehypothecation—reusing pledged collat-
eral. Large banks and dealers often reuse collateral pledged by hedge funds, pension
funds, and other institutions, and this practice means that collateral has a velocity.
Collateral rehypothecation creates liquidity and lubricates the financial system, but
can have adverse consequences for financial stability. Singh (2011) argues that during
the financial crisis debt capacity declined through two channels: (1) lower availability
of collateral due to fall in asset prices and increase in haircuts and (2) lower leverage
multiplier due to shortening of intermediation chains.
We measure to what extent collateral is reused in our dataset. Table 1.6 shows
what percentage of the collateral received by the banks in reverse repo transactions is
reused in repos to borrow against. The results in Panel A are weighted by the value
of transactions, and in Panel B they are equally weighted. This information provides
an indication of the the extent of collateral reuse collateral received in reverse repo
transactions by banks. In Table 1.6, high and low quality refer to investment-grade
and non-investment-grade securities respectively.
Overall, the table suggests that government securities have the highest reuse rate,
which is as expected given the liquidity of government bond markets. Collateral
with longer residual maturity tends to have a higher reuse rate, except for securiti-
sation with 10Y+ residual maturity. Collateral quality seems to have mixed effects
on the reuse rate. Investment grade government bonds tend to have higher reuse rate
than non-investment grade ones; however the opposite is true for corporate bonds.
Comparing the value-weighted and non-value-weighted results in Table 1.6 shows that
rehypothecation is concentrated on particular securities, especially high quality gov-
ernment bonds.
1.3 The Determinants of Haircuts
We now analyse what explanatory variables govern haircuts and in what ways these
variables affect them. For this purpose we run multiple regressions on reverse repo
and repo data separately, with different specifications as described below.
For the most part of the regression analysis, we focus on the sample excluding
the trades with CCPs. In practice, CCPs often calculate haircuts (or initial margin
requirements) on a portfolio basis. That is, the over-collateralisation of repo posi-
tions is calculated at the portfolio or netting set level, without applying haircuts on
individual transactions. In our dataset, firms still report a transaction-level haircut,
but this is often zero given that the ‘true’ haircut is applied at the portfolio level. In
such cases, it is not meaningful to look at haircuts on individual transactions that are
centrally cleared. In addition, there is basically only one CCP in our sample, which
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uses a fixed schedule of haircuts available online. Therefore, we focus on the sample
that excludes CCP transactions.
There are a lot of zero haircuts in the data as illustrated by the histogram of hair-
cuts in Figure 1.1. Some of these zero haircuts are due to the way haircuts are reported
in CCP trades as explained above, but even excluding CCP trades, zero-haircut trades
are still prevalent. A summary of these trades is presented in Table 1.10. This finding
is not surprising and has been confirmed by other data collections done at the global
level. In order to make sure that the multitude of zero haircuts do not distort our
results, in addition to the ordinary least square regressions, we perform two sets of
additional regressions. We use Tobit model with truncation at zero as our baseline
model. In addition, we use logit transform to generate more variation in haircuts and
to run logistic regression.
Table 1.7 explains all the explanatory variables used in different regressions. We
have dummy variables for currencies as well as collateral and counterparty types.
Other than dummy variables we use trade-specific variables, collateral rating and ma-
turity, and counterparty characteristics. We also have two measures for counter-
party and collateral concentration. Counterparty concentration measures the share
of transactions with a specific counterparty in total, evaluated using the notional
amount of transactions. It represent how systemically important that counterparty
is to the bank. Similarly, collateral concentration is measured by the share of trans-
actions against a specific collateral in total, evaluated using the notional amount of
transactions. We also include an interaction term between collateral rating and coun-
terparty rating. The logic behind the this term is to find whether counterparty and
collateral quality can compensate for each other.
Table 1.8 shows summary statistics for haircuts and non-dummy explanatory vari-
ables for the sample used in the baseline regressions which excludes the deals with
CCPs. Except collateral and counterparty ratings which are categorical, other vari-
ables in this table are continuous. The summary statistics are represented separately
for reverse repos and repos in Panels A and B respectively, given that haircut practices
can potentially differ significantly between the two instruments. The sample only
includes the six banks that provided data on haircuts and collateral ID. Variables have
been winsorised at 0.5% level.
Even though haircuts can have as high value as 46%, the weighted average of hair-
cuts is about 6% both for reverse repos and repos. Notional values are log-transformed.
Maturity values, both for transactions and collateral, are in year. The weighted aver-
age of maturity for the transactions is about 50 to 70 days, while the mean is less at
around 20 days. Average collateral maturity used is between 2 and 3 years. Collateral
and counterparty ratings are modified into numeric scale from 1 to 20, with 20 being
the highest rating. The average collateral quality in this scale is about 17, while the
average counterparty rating is between 14 and 15.
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The summary statistics for counterparty return on assets (RoA), leverage, CDS
spread, and cash ratio are also presented in Table 1.8, and the respective definitions
are in Table 1.7. The logic for including RoA is to see how profitability of the coun-
terparty can affect haircuts, and cash ratio is intended to proxy for liquidity needs.
Overall the summary statistics for reverse repos and repos are not significantly differ-
ent.
Table 1.9 exhibits summary of the dummy variables for the sample used in the
baseline regressions which excludes the deals with CCPs. The sample includes the six
banks that provide data on haircuts and collateral ID, and the percentages represent
frequency of transactions.
Over 50% of transactions are conducted with other banks and broker-dealers, and
hedge funds and other asset managers are next prominent counterparties. Govern-
ment bonds account for 50% of collateral in reverse repos but only 36% in repos. In
repos, corporate bonds constitute 54%, considerably higher than government bonds.
This evidence suggests that the reporting banks borrow more than they lend against
corporate bonds and securitised products, while the opposite is true about govern-
ment bonds. This observation is confirmed by inspecting the total notional values
reported in Table 1.1 Panel D.
In Tables 1.11–1.16 we present the main results of the paper. These tables show
regression results to understand what factors determine haircuts. The dependent vari-
able is haircut in all tables and explanatory variables are listed in second column.
We have classified explanatory variables into several categories. These categories are
shown in the first column. The columns that are labeled with numbers display re-
gression coefficients for different explanatory variables. Standard errors, which are
not reported, are clustered at reporting bank level. One and two stars denote 10%
and 5% significance levels respectively. The tables exhibit the results for Tobit, OLS,
and Logistic regressions for reverse repos and repos. The next two sections elaborate
on the main results presented in Tables 1.11–1.16.
1.3.1 Reverse Repo Results
The results in Tables 1.11–1.13 are for reverse repo transactions. In these transactions
the reporting bank lends cash and receives collateral, and the counterparty borrows
money and delivers collateral to the bank. Hence, counterparty characteristics corre-
spond to borrower characteristics in these transactions.
Table 1.11 presents the outcome of the baseline Tobit regression, and Tables 1.12
and 1.13 show the OLS and Logistic regressions respectively. Overall the Tobit model
seem to describe the data better and results have more significance using this model,
however, the main results that we will emphasise below are robust to the choice of
model.
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Column (1) in these tables, reports the result when smallest set of explanatory
variables is used. In this column, we include currency dummies, notional and matu-
rity of transaction, collateral characteristics (rating and maturity) and collateral type
dummies, and dummies for counterparty type, but we leave out counterparty char-
acteristics. In column (2) we add counterparty characteristics and concentration mea-
sures for counterparties and collateral. Column (3) uses the largest set of regressors by
adding the reporting bank characteristics to the ones used in column (2). In column
(4) we add reporting bank characteristics to the initial set of regressors used in (1),
excluding the counterparty characteristics. Finally columns (5) and (6) are similar to
column (4), but they include network centrality measures described in Section 1.4.
In columns (1) and (2) we do not include the reporting bank characteristics, in-
stead we look for haircut determinants by assessing the effects of explanatory variables
within transactions conducted by each reporting bank. This is achieved by including
reporting bank fixed effects in the regressions. We also report regressions including
the reporting bank characteristics (own variables) in columns (3) and (4). These vari-
ables are specially relevant for repos where the reporting banks are borrowers and we
can expect that their attributes should matter in specifying haircut level.
Notional value of transaction does not influence haircuts. On the other hand ma-
turity has a significant positive and robust effect on haircuts across all specifications,
so the higher the maturity of transaction the higher would be the haircut. As col-
umn (1) in Table 1.11 shows, 1% increase in maturity increases haircuts by 11.9 basis
points.3 Another variable that has a significant and robust effect is collateral rating.
As expected higher quality collateral receives lower haircut. One notch increase in
collateral rating, reduces haircuts by 1.3 percentage points. Controlling for collateral
rating, the maturity and type of collateral (government, corporate, or securitisation)
does not significantly affect haircuts.
Among the counterparty types, hedge funds receive significantly higher haircuts
in all specifications. Relative to the baseline haircut received by banks, hedge funds
face haircuts that are on average 13.4 percentage points higher, as shown in column
(1) in Table 1.11. Some, but not all of this effect can be described by counterparty
characteristics. Broker-dealers receive lower haircut in most specifications, but the
effect becomes weak once we account for other counterparty characteristics such as
rating and size.
Results in column (2) of Tables 1.11–1.13 show that larger counterparties and
borrowers with higher ratings receive lower haircut. A one-unit increase in log of
counterparty size or one notch increase in its rating decrease haircuts by 3.1 and 1.8
percentage points respectively. Higher counterparty leverage increases the haircut,
although this effect is insignificant except in Tobit regressions. An important ques-
tion about haircuts is that how collateral risk and counterparty risk interact. There
3Deal maturity is log transformed.
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is a significant and positive coefficient on the interaction term between counterparty
and collateral rating. Excluding this interaction term from the regression weakens the
magnitude and significance of the effect of counterparty characteristics. This obser-
vation means that collateral quality can overshadow counterparty characteristics. It
seems that borrowers with lower ratings try to use higher quality collateral to receive
a lower haircut, and as a consequence the influences of counterparty attributes are
concealed. After accounting for this interaction we can observe that larger counter-
parties and borrowers with higher ratings receive lower haircut.
Haircuts increase with the counterparty concentration, therefore the banks charge
significantly higher haircut when dealing with institutions that borrow relatively large
sums from them and hence are systematically important to them. On the other hand,
collateral concentration plays no significant role.
We should interpret the results related to the reporting bank characteristics (own
variables) in columns (3)–(4) with a grain of salt due to the small size of the sample
of reporting banks. Nevertheless, they show that profitable lenders with more cash
available to them charge lower haircuts on average. We defer the discussion of the
results in columns (5)–(6) to Section 1.4 on network analysis.
1.3.2 Repo Results
We present analogous results for repos in Tables 1.14–1.16. In these transactions
the reporting bank borrows cash and delivers collateral, and the counterparty lends
money and receives collateral. Hence, counterparty characteristics correspond to
lender characteristics in these transactions. Columns (1)–(6) are equivalent to the cor-
responding columns in Tables 1.11–1.13.
Overall some of the results for repos are less stable across specifications and more
difficult to interpret. Similar to the reverse repos, higher maturity increases haircut on
a transaction. As column (1) in Table 1.14 shows, 1% increase in maturity increases
haircuts by 5.7 basis points. Notional value in Tobit regressions has a negative and
significant effect, but the sign alters in the other two specifications (but with no or
marginal significance). The effect of collateral rating is the most robust result in all
specifications and also across repos and reverse repos. Similar to reverse repos, higher
quality collateral always receives lower haircut, with one notch increase in collateral
rating reducing haircuts by 0.4 percentage points. As can be seen in Table 1.1 Panel
D, most of the securitisation collateral is used in repos, and although there was no
visible effect for reverse repos, haircut is higher for it relative to government bond
after controlling for other variables in repos. This result is weak nonetheless. The
effect of collateral maturity is insignificant as before.
Insurance and pension funds charge higher haircuts as lender relative to other
banks. There seems to be a similar effect for hedge funds, but it is not robust and the
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coefficient changes sign in Tobit regressions by adding counterparty characteristics.
Similar unstable results exist for broker-dealers and central banks and governments.
The counterparty—i.e. lender in a repo—characteristics appear to matter for hair-
cuts one way or another, although the results are less stable and difficult to interpret.
The result that is most stable is that counterparties with higher CDS spread charge a
lower haircut. Lender size, RoA, leverage, and cash ratio also have unstable effects
across some of the specifications. Both collateral and counterparty concentration
have positive coefficients although they are not significant in all of the specifications.
In theory borrower characteristics should be more relevant in determining hair-
cuts and therefore ought to be included in the explanatory regressions for repos.
We represent the results with the reporting bank characteristics (own variables) in
columns (3)–(4). As expected, reporting bank characteristics, have significant impact
on haircuts that are stable unlike the lender attributes. Larger, more profitable, less
leveraged banks who have a low CDS spread and high cash ratio receive smaller hair-
cuts. Significance levels change, but the signs are stable and the attributes have the
expected impact on the dependent variable. Nevertheless the concern about this re-
gression is the small size of the sample of reporting banks.
1.3.3 Bank versus Non-Bank Counterparties
In order to see how haircuts applied between two banks differ from the haircuts be-
tween a bank and a non-bank entity, we run a different set of regressions, with results
reported in Tables 1.17–1.22. These regressions are analogous to the ones in Tables
1.11–1.16, except that there is only one dummy variable for counterparty type which
takes value of 1 if the counterparty is a bank or broker-dealer, and 0 otherwise.
The coefficient on bank/dealer dummy is negative both for repos and reverse re-
pos in all specifications. It is significant in all repo specifications, and Tobit reverse
repo regressions. This result shows that when banks trade with institutions similar
to themselves they charge lower haircuts, controlling for all observables like counter-
party or collateral rating, maturity, etc. This observation can be related to the fact
that the two parties in a repo contract may disagree on the collateral value and charg-
ing haircut is a tool to mitigate the disagreement. Similar institutions use comparable
models and therefore it is more likely that two banks have less disagreement than two
completely different entities, say a bank and a hedge fund, hence the lower haircuts
for bank/dealer counterparty in our sample.
1.4 Network Analysis
The financial crisis has shown the importance of the interconnectedness of the bank-
ing system and the need to analyse risk not by looking at individual institutions in
17
isolation, but by assessing network structure and interplay between institutions. As
a result various studies have used network analysis tools to study the interbank and
inter-dealer markets (e.g. Denbee et al. (2014) and Li and Schürhoff (2012)).
In this part we try to examine the network structure of the UK repo market us-
ing our dataset. We use network centrality measures borrowed from the literature
on network analysis and employed by Li and Schürhoff (2012). Table 1.23 provides
summary statistics of these measures (for definitions see Li and Schürhoff (2012)).
Figure 1.2 displays the repo market network plot. The network plot shows the
reporting banks in yellow and size of the nodes is proportional to total degree mea-
sure. Panel A is based on all transactions of the entire sample (ten reporting banks)
while Panel B is based on the sample of the six banks that report haircut and collateral
information and are used in the regression analysis.
In order to see if network structure affects haircuts in the repo market, we use
principal component of the unweighted and weighted centrality measures in the ex-
planatory regressions. The results are presented in columns (5)–(6) of Tables 1.11–
1.16 for reverse repos and repos. These columns are similar to column (4) in their
corresponding tables, but they include the principal component of either unweighted
(pcu) or weighted (pcw) centrality measures in column (5) and (6), respectively. We
see that the banks with higher centrality measures ask for more haircuts on reverse
repos and pay lower haircuts on repos, which is consistent with the story that these
banks have higher market power. The results using weighted or unweighted measures
are virtually the same.
In unreported regressions we use the entire sample including the CCP deals. None
of the results mentioned above changes significantly, with two notable exceptions.
Firstly, with CCP transactions, the two network measures are not significant in any
case, so we do not observe any meaningful network effect when CCP transactions are
included. Furthermore, including CCP transactions attenuates the impact of coun-
terparty concentration on increasing the haircuts. Overall, given the issues described
in Section 1.3, it seems that including CCP transactions introduces some noise in the
way that the architecture of the market affects haircuts and it is to be expected that
the results related to the network measures and counterparty concentration become
less significant.
1.5 Conclusion
In this study we analyse the structure of the UK repo market using a regulatory dataset
collated by the UK regulator. We examine the maturity structure, collateral types and
different counterparty types that engage in this market and try to estimate the extent
of collateral rehypothecation by the reporting banks. We try to answer the ques-
tion of what variables determine haircuts using transaction-level data. We find that
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collateral rating and transaction maturity have first order importance in setting hair-
cuts. Banks charge higher haircuts when they transact with non-bank institutions. In
particular, hedge funds as borrowers receive a significantly higher haircut even after
controlling for measures of counterparty risk. Larger borrowers with higher ratings
receive lower haircuts, but this effect can be overshadowed by collateral quality, be-
cause weaker borrowers try to use higher quality collateral to receive a lower haircut.
Banks charge higher haircut when trading with institutions that are systematically im-
portant to them. Finally, we examine the structure and attributes of the repo market
network to assess if the network structure has an influence over haircuts. We observe
that the banks with higher centrality measures ask for more haircuts on reverse repos
and pay lower haircuts on repos.
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1.6 Appendix
1.6.1 Figures
Figure 1.1: Histogram of haircuts
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Figure 1.2: Network flows plot
A. Whole sample (10 banks)
B. Sample of banks that report haircut and collateral info (6 banks)
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1.6.2 Tables
Table 1.1: The breakdown of value of contracts (in £bn) by maturity, currency,
counterparty type, and collateral type
REVR REPO
Value Percent Value Percent
A. Maturity
Overnight 41.4 6.0% -62.2 8.1%
<3m 432.8 62.3% -469.4 61.3%
3m-1y 173.6 25.0% -166.6 21.8%
1y-5y 28.6 4.1% -41.0 5.3%
5y+ 18.5 2.7% -26.4 3.5%
Total 694.9 100.0% -765.6 100.0%
B. Currency
GBP 240.3 34.6% -297.8 38.9%
EUR 247.7 35.6% -211.7 27.7%
USD 168.2 24.2% -235.8 30.8%
JPY 21.9 3.1% -10.0 1.3%
Other 16.8 2.4% -10.2 1.3%
Total 694.9 100.0% -765.6 100.0%
C. Counterparty type
Another reporting bank a 49.4 7.1% -54.5 7.1%
Other banks 138.4 19.9% -128.9 16.8%
Broker-dealer b 78.0 11.2% -66.6 8.7%
Hedge fund 87.2 12.6% -63.1 8.2%
MMF c 0.7 0.1% -9.4 1.2%
Other asset managers d 53.9 7.8% -106.2 13.9%
CCP e 227.6 32.8% -206.2 26.9%
Insurance and pension 32.8 4.7% -24.9 3.2%
Central bank & govt 15.8 2.3% -90.3 11.8%
Other f 11.0 1.6% -15.7 2.0%
Total 694.9 100.0% -765.6 100.0%
D. Collateral type
US govt 10.9 6.0% -5.4 2.9%
UK govt 83.1 45.7% -111.7 59.1%
Germany govt 25.5 14.0% -19.1 10.1%
France govt 16.9 9.3% -7.2 3.8%
Supranational 3.7 2.0% -4.6 2.4%
GIIPS g 0.5 0.3% 0.0 0.0%
Other sovereign 31.4 17.3% -15.7 8.3%
Corporate 7.5 4.1% -11.7 6.2%
Securitisation 2.0 1.1% -13.5 7.1%
Other 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0%
Total 181.6 100.0% -188.9 100.0%
The table presents the breakdown of the deals by maturity, currency, counterparty type,
and collateral type (Panels A, B, C, and D respectively). For each category, it shows the
value of the trades in billion Pounds and the percentage of total trades for the reverse
repos and repos respectively. In Panels A, B, and C, the total values are based on the data
from the ten reporting banks. The total values in Panel D are based on the data from the
six banks that report haircut and collateral information.
a The reporting banks report on a UK-consolidated basis, but counterparties are reported
on a global basis. Therefore there may be discrepancies between the reverse repos and
repos with the reporting banks.
b Broker-dealers are mostly securities firms that are subsidiaries of large banks. c Money
market fund. d Non-leveraged non-MMF mutual funds—asset managers that are not
hedge fund or MMF. e Central (clearing) counterparty. f Includes corporations, schools,
hospitals and other non-profit organisations. g Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and
Spain government bonds.
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Table 1.2: The breakdown of average haircuts by ma-
turity, currency, counterparty type, and collateral type
REVR REPO
A. Maturity
Overnight 1.8% 0.5%
<3m 5.2% 4.8%
3m-1y 8.8% 8.5%
1y-5y 13.7% 14.8%
5y+ N/A 15.9%
B. Currency
GBP 8.1% 7.6%
EUR 3.7% 7.1%
USD 5.8% 3.2%
JPY 4.3% 0.6%
Other 6.8% 2.1%
C. Counterparty type
Another reporting bank a 4.0% 5.6%
Other banks 6.1% 6.3%
Broker-dealer b 3.1% 6.1%
Hedge fund 18.7% 5.0%
MMF c N/A 1.5%
Other asset managers d 10.7% 1.7%
CCP e -5.3% f 5.7%
Insurance and pension 10.1% 8.8%
Central bank & govt 2.7% 5.0%
Other g 0.1% 3.7%
D. Collateral type
US govt 2.6% 1.4%
UK govt 7.7% 6.2%
Germany govt 0.9% 2.1%
France govt 5.9% 2.3%
Supranational 0.4% 1.4%
GIIPS h 18.4% 14.0%
Other sovereign 4.3% 3.7%
Corporate 5.4% 5.9%
Securitisation 17.7% 16.0%
Other 15.8% N/A
Overall average i 5.9% 6.2%
The table presents the breakdown of the deals by maturity,
currency, counterparty type, and collateral type (Panels A,
B, C, and D respectively). For each category, it shows the
average haircut for the reverse repos and repos respectively.
The averages are weighted by the gross notional of the trans-
actions. The haircuts are based on the data from the six banks
that report haircut and collateral information.
a The reporting banks report on a UK-consolidated basis, but
counterparties are reported on a global basis. Therefore there
may be discrepancies between the reverse repos and repos
with the reporting banks.
b Broker-dealers are mostly securities firms that are sub-
sidiaries of large banks. c Money market fund. d Non-
leveraged non-MMF mutual funds—asset managers that are
not hedge fund or MMF. e Central (clearing) counterparty.
f CCPs always receive a haircut, whether in a reverse repo or
repo. So banks doing a reverse repo with a CCP will need
to give a haircut, which amounts to a negative value for av-
erage haircut. g Includes corporations, schools, hospitals
and other non-profit organisations. h Greece, Italy, Ireland,
Portugal, and Spain government bonds. i Excludes the deals
with CCPs.
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Table 1.3: The breakdown of reverse repos
Counterparty type
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
A. Maturity
Overnight 0.6 0.9 1.9 0.4 0.0 0.1 1.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 5.9
<3m 3.9 11.8 6.9 10.5 0.1 5.0 19.4 2.6 1.1 1.0 62.3
3m-1y 1.9 5.8 1.8 1.0 0.0 2.0 9.6 1.6 0.9 0.4 25.0
1y-5y 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.7 1.3 0.2 0.3 0.1 4.2
5y+ 0.4 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 2.6
Total 7.1 19.8 11.2 12.6 0.1 7.8 32.9 4.7 2.3 1.5 100.0
B. Currency
GBP 2.5 4.8 2.2 2.2 0.1 4.7 15.7 1.4 0.7 0.3 34.6
EUR 2.1 7.3 3.7 2.7 0.0 1.3 15.7 2.0 0.7 0.2 35.7
USD 2.3 6.0 3.8 6.3 0.1 1.6 1.4 1.1 0.7 1.0 24.3
JPY 0.0 0.9 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 3.2
Other 0.1 0.9 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 2.2
Total 7.1 19.8 11.2 12.6 0.1 7.8 32.9 4.7 2.3 1.5 100.0
C. Collateral type
US govt 1.6 0.8 1.5 0.6 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 6.0
UK govt 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.0 3.7 37.7 1.5 0.2 1.2 45.6
Germany govt 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.5 10.7 0.5 1.0 0.1 14.0
France govt 0.0 1.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 6.4 0.8 0.1 0.3 9.3
Supranational 0.1 1.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.0 2.1
GIIPS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
Other sovereign 1.1 5.2 1.7 0.8 0.0 0.4 7.0 0.1 0.9 0.3 17.4
Corporate 0.5 0.6 1.0 0.9 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.4 4.2
Securitisation 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 1.2
Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 4.1 9.7 5.2 3.9 0.0 5.7 62.5 3.5 3.1 2.4 100.0
This table exhibits a finer breakdown of the reverse repo contracts. The numbers are in percentage points and indicate
the percentage of notional value in each category. The data is double sorted by counterparty type (columns) and
maturity, currency and collateral type in Panels A, B, and C respectively. The table is based on the data from the the
six banks that report haircut and collateral information. Columns 1–10 refer to the following counterparty types:
1. Another reporting bank
2. Other banks
3. Broker-dealer
4. Hedge fund
5. MMF
6. Other asset managers
7. CCP
8. Insurance and pension
9. Central bank & govt
10. Other
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Table 1.4: The breakdown of repos
Counterparty type
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
A. Maturity
Overnight 0.8 3.1 1.3 0.6 0.0 1.3 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.0 8.1
<3m 3.7 7.7 4.5 5.8 1.2 11.5 15.1 2.5 7.7 1.7 61.4
3m-1y 1.6 3.9 1.4 0.9 0.0 0.8 9.5 0.6 2.7 0.3 21.7
1y-5y 0.6 1.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.9 0.0 5.3
5y+ 0.4 1.2 0.3 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 3.5
Total 7.1 16.9 8.7 8.3 1.2 13.8 26.9 3.3 11.8 2.0 100.0
B. Currency
GBP 2.5 4.2 2.0 1.1 0.7 4.5 18.3 1.2 4.1 0.2 38.7
EUR 1.7 5.8 2.3 2.8 0.2 2.8 8.0 0.2 3.7 0.2 27.6
USD 2.8 5.8 3.9 3.9 0.3 6.4 0.6 1.8 3.8 1.6 30.8
JPY 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.4
Other 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.4
Total 7.1 16.9 8.7 8.3 1.2 13.8 26.9 3.3 11.8 2.0 100.0
C. Collateral type
US govt 0.3 1.7 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 2.9
UK govt 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.5 49.9 0.5 4.1 0.4 59.2
Germany govt 0.0 2.5 0.2 1.6 0.0 0.4 3.1 0.0 2.2 0.2 10.2
France govt 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.4 1.2 0.0 0.4 0.0 3.8
Supranational 0.0 0.8 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.1 2.4
GIIPS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other sovereign 0.2 2.0 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.1 2.5 0.1 1.4 0.1 8.2
Corporate 0.2 2.1 0.8 0.4 0.0 0.6 0.0 1.9 0.2 0.0 6.2
Securitisation 1.7 2.6 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 7.1
Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 2.6 13.5 5.2 4.3 1.0 3.4 57.5 2.6 9.1 0.8 100.0
This table exhibits a finer breakdown of the repo contracts. The numbers are in percentage points and indicate the
percentage of notional value in each category. The data is double sorted by counterparty type (columns) and maturity,
currency and collateral type in Panels A, B, and C respectively. The table is based on the data from the the six banks
that report haircut and collateral information. Columns 1–10 refer to the following counterparty types:
1. Another reporting bank
2. Other banks
3. Broker-dealer
4. Hedge fund
5. MMF
6. Other asset managers
7. CCP
8. Insurance and pension
9. Central bank & govt
10. Other
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Table 1.5: Haircuts on sovereign bond collateral
A. REVR
UK Germany France US
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
A1. Collateral maturity
<10Y 31.91% 3.8% 76.53% 0.6% 77.49% 3.4% 84.61% 2.2%
>10Y 68.09% 9.5% 23.47% 3.1% 22.51% 4.8% 15.39% 4.6%
A2. Counterparty type
Oth managers a 35.17% 12.6% 16.20% 0.0% 4.31% 5.6% 13.19% 1.2%
Other 64.83% 5.1% 83.80% 1.4% 95.69% 3.6% 86.81% 2.9%
B. REPO
UK Germany France US
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
B1. Collateral maturity
<10Y 71.68% 4.8% 64.11% 2.6% 61.60% 2.0% 96.88% 1.3%
>10Y 28.32% 9.4% 35.89% 0.0% 38.40% 1.3% 3.12% 9.1%
B2. Counterparty type
Government 61.7% 8.2% 48.8% 2.0% 0.8% 0.1% 2.4% 0.2%
Other 38.3% 4.5% 51.2% 1.4% 99.2% 2.2% 97.6% 1.8%
This table shows the breakdown of reverse repo (Panel A) and repo (Panel B) contracts on government bond collateral. The
information is broken down by 1. collateral maturity, and 2. counterparty type. For each sovereign bond (e.g. UK government
bond) column 1 shows the percentage of the notional amount against that collateral for the given category, and column 2 shows
the corresponding average haircut for that category (the averages are weighted by the gross notional of the transactions). The
sample only includes the six banks that provided data on haircuts and collateral.
a Other asset managers
Table 1.6: The extent of collateral reuse
Collateral maturity
Collateral type Quality <1Y 1-5Y 5-10Y 10Y+ Mean
A. Value-weighted
Government High 50% 41% 57% 62% 52%
Low 18% 10% 18% 28% 18%
Corporate High 15% 18% 23% 11% 17%
Low 29% 36% 27% 23% 28%
Securitisation High 14% 16% 51% 7% 21%
Low 26% 37% 21% 0% 24%
Mean 47% 39% 53% 58% 49%
B. Non-value-weighted
Government High 19% 26% 35% 13% 22%
Low 36% 20% 33% 51% 35%
Corporate High 16% 17% 22% 15% 17%
Low 27% 28% 31% 33% 29%
Securitisation High 9% 14% 25% 5% 13%
Low 15% 20% 19% 0% 17%
Mean 18% 21% 29% 15% 21%
This table shows what percentage of the collateral received by the banks in reverse repo
transactions is reused in repos to borrow against. This information provides an indication
of the the extent of collateral reuse. The results in Panel A are weighted by the value of
transactions, and in Panel B there are equally weighted. The sample only includes the six
banks that provided data on haircuts and collateral. High and low quality refer to investment-
grade and non-investment-grade securities respectively.
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Table 1.7: Description of the explanatory variables
Variable Description
gbp Dummy variable = 1 if transaction is in GBP.
eur Dummy variable = 1 if transaction is in EUR.
jpy Dummy variable = 1 if transaction is in JPY.
othercurrency Dummy variable = 1 if transaction is not GBP, EUR or JPY.
notional Notional of the transaction in million Pounds (log transformed).
maturity Maturity of the transaction in years (log transformed).
collrating Rating of the collateral: 20 is highest and 1 is lowest.
collmaturity Maturity of the collateral in years (log transformed).
corpdebt Dummy variable = 1 if collateral is corporate bond.
securitisation Dummy variable = 1 if collateral is securitisation.
brokerdealers Dummy variable = 1 if counterparty is broker-dealers.
hedgefund Dummy variable = 1 if counterparty is hedge fund.
othermanager Dummy variable = 1 if counterparty is other asset managers.
ccp Dummy variable = 1 if counterparty is CCP.
insur&pension Dummy variable = 1 if counterparty is insurance company or pension fund.
cb&govt Dummy variable = 1 if counterparty is central bank or government.
other Dummy variable = 1 if counterparty is other type.
cptysize Size of the counterparty in million Pounds (log transformed).
cptyroa RoA of the counterparty (log transformed).
cptyrating Rating of the counterparty: 20 is highest and 1 is lowest.
cptyleverage Leverage ratio of the counterparty (RWA over equity) (log transformed).
cptycds CDS spread of the counterparty (log transformed).
cptycashratio Cash ratio of the counterparty (cash over short-term debt) (log transformed).
nocptydata Dummy variable = 1 there is no counterparty data.
cptycon Concentration of the counterparty measured by the share of transactions with
that counterparty in total: higher number indicates more concentration.
collcon Concentration of the collateral measured by the share of transactions against that
collateral in total: higher number indicates more concentration.
cpty&collrating Interaction term between counterparty rating and collateral rating
ownsizelog Size of the reporting bank in million Pounds (log transformed).
ownroa RoA of the reporting bank (log transformed).
ownleverage Leverage ratio of the reporting bank (RWA over equity) (log transformed).
owncds CDS spread of the reporting bank (log transformed).
owncashratio Cash ratio of the reporting bank (cash over short-term debt) (log transformed).
pcu Principal component of the network centrality measures for unweighted network.
pcw Principal component of the network centrality measures for weighted network.
bank/dealer Dummy variable = 1 if counterparty is a bank or broker-dealer.
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Table 1.8: Summary statistics for the sample excluding deals with CCPs
Variable Obs Mean Std dev Min Max Average a
A. REVR
Haircut 7397 5.94% 10.17% 0.00% 46.11% 5.89%
Notional 10435 6.25 0.86 3.44 8.32 7.55
Maturity 10435 0.06 0.11 0.00 1.39 0.14
Collateral maturity 7085 2.36 0.75 0.80 3.81 2.25
Collateral rating 5729 14.5 4.8 1.0 20.0 17.2
Ctpy size 6512 5.17 0.70 3.57 6.25 5.41
Ctpy RoA 6506 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.00
Ctpy leverage 6469 1.69 0.23 1.09 2.40 1.78
Ctpy CDS 5593 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02
Ctpy cash ratio 6428 -1.68 1.07 -3.40 1.47 -1.46
Ctpy rating 6495 14.6 1.4 3.0 20.0 14.4
B. REPO
Haircut 7386 2.37% 5.82% 0.00% 46.11% 6.24%
Notional 11896 6.18 0.79 3.44 8.32 7.70
Maturity 11905 0.05 0.18 0.00 1.39 0.20
Collateral maturity 8993 2.03 0.63 0.80 3.81 2.09
Collateral rating 8629 14.3 5.0 1.0 20.0 18.3
Ctpy size 8380 5.37 0.62 3.57 6.25 5.43
Ctpy RoA 8367 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.00
Ctpy leverage 7300 1.74 0.25 1.09 2.40 1.79
Ctpy CDS 5908 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02
Ctpy cash ratio 8092 -1.31 1.14 -3.40 1.47 -1.51
Ctpy rating 8445 15.2 2.0 3.0 20.0 14.8
The table shows the summary statistics of variables used in the regressions excluding the deals with
CCPs, for repo and reverse repo transactions. The sample only includes the six banks that provided data
on haircuts and collateral. Variables have been winsorised at 0.5% level. Rating scale is 1–20, with 20
being the highest rating.
a Average is weighted by the gross notional of transactions.
Table 1.9: Summary of the regression sample excluding deals with CCPs
Category Subcategory REVR REPO
Currency GBP 17.3% 7.9%
USD 44.2% 42.3%
EUR 34.1% 46.5%
JPY 1.6% 0.8%
Other 2.8% 2.5%
Counterparty type Another reporting bank 2.1% 4.2%
Other banks 40.9% 43.6%
Broker-dealer 23.0% 23.0%
Hedge fund 12.8% 10.6%
Other asset managers 8.0% 9.4%
Insurance and pension 6.1% 5.1%
Central bank and govt 1.5% 3.2%
Other 5.6% 0.7%
Collateral type Sovereign 49.9% 36.1%
Corporate debt 42.1% 54.0%
Securitisation 7.6% 9.9%
Other 0.5% 0.0%
The table presents breakdown of deals by currency, counterparty and collateral type,
and collateral maturity, for the sample used in the regressions excluding the deals with
CCPs. The sample only includes the six banks that provided data on haircuts and col-
lateral. The percentages represent frequency of deals.
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Table 1.10: Summary of the zero-haircut sample excluding deals with CCPs
Category Subcategory REVR REPO
Currency GBP 33.6% 6.3%
USD 22.1% 40.0%
EUR 40.5% 51.0%
JPY 1.6% 0.9%
Other 2.2% 1.9%
Counterparty type Another reporting bank 4.3% 2.2%
Other banks 53.4% 68.7%
Broker-dealer 6.1% 9.5%
Hedge fund 0.9% 0.0%
Other asset managers 6.4% 16.0%
Insurance and pension 11.6% 1.4%
Central bank and govt 2.2% 1.6%
Other 15.2% 0.5%
Collateral type Sovereign 36.7% 44.2%
Corporate debt 63.0% 43.9%
Securitisation 0.3% 11.9%
Other 0.0% 0.0%
The table presents breakdown of deals by currency, counterparty and collateral type,
and collateral maturity, for the sample of deals with zero haircut, excluding the deals
with CCPs. The sample only includes the six banks that provided data on haircuts and
collateral. The percentages represent frequency of deals.
29
Table 1.11: Reverse repo Tobit regressions excluding CCPs
Category Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deal var notional 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.010 0.007 0.007
maturity 0.119* 0.125** 0.111* 0.101 0.114* 0.114*
Collateral var collrating -0.013** -0.016** -0.016** -0.012** -0.012** -0.012**
collmaturity -0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
corpdebt -0.008 -0.011 -0.012 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008
securitisation 0.040 0.022 0.022 0.039 0.040 0.040
Cpty type brokerdealers -0.028** -0.015** -0.014 -0.027** -0.028** -0.028**
hedgefund 0.134** 0.093** 0.089** 0.133** 0.133** 0.133**
othermanager 0.080** 0.048 0.042 0.076** 0.078** 0.078**
insur&pension 0.038 0.016 0.012 0.035 0.037 0.037
cb&govt -0.010 -0.008 -0.008 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011
other 0.043 0.012 0.008 0.041 0.043 0.043
Cpty var cptysize -0.031** -0.030**
cptyroa -3.331* -3.249
cptyrating -0.018** -0.018**
cptyleverage 0.093** 0.089**
cptycds 0.503 0.217
cptycashratio -0.002 -0.001
nocptydata -0.058 -0.057
Misc cptycon 0.225** 0.224**
collcon 0.139 0.145
cpty&collrating 0.001** 0.001**
Own var ownsizelog -0.104 -0.149** -0.143* -0.150*
ownroa -25.998** -30.534** -20.146* -20.146*
ownleverage 0.456 0.844 1.219** 1.063*
owncds -6.444 -13.869* -11.510 -17.639**
owncashratio -0.142** -0.191** -0.215** -0.263**
Network var pcu 0.044**
pcw 0.045**
Bank FE Yes Yes No No No No
Currency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 4414 4414 4414 4414 4414 4414
Pseudo R2 2.89 2.97 2.97 2.89 2.90 2.90
The table shows Tobit regression results for reverse repos excluding deals with CCPs, where the Tobit model with truncation at zero
is used. The dependent variable is haircut and explanatory variables are listed in the second column. The first column shows the
category of explanatory variable. The columns that are labeled with numbers display regression coefficients for different explanatory
variables. Standard errors (not reported) are clustered at reporting bank level. One and two stars denote 10% and 5% significance levels
respectively.
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Table 1.12: Reverse repo OLS regressions excluding CCPs
Category Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deal var notional -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000
maturity 0.077** 0.093** 0.086** 0.069* 0.071** 0.071**
Collateral var collrating -0.009** -0.014** -0.014** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009**
collmaturity -0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
corpdebt -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
securitisation 0.040 0.028 0.027 0.039 0.040 0.040
Cpty type brokerdealers -0.019** -0.013 -0.012 -0.019** -0.019** -0.019**
hedgefund 0.135** 0.103** 0.100** 0.135** 0.134** 0.134**
othermanager 0.063 0.049 0.045 0.061 0.061 0.061
insur&pension 0.018 0.012 0.010 0.018 0.018 0.018
cb&govt 0.020 0.028 0.026 0.019 0.019 0.019
other 0.017 0.004 0.004 0.018 0.018 0.018
Cpty var cptysize -0.028** -0.027**
cptyroa -3.410 -3.135
cptyrating -0.019** -0.020**
cptyleverage 0.036 0.034
cptycds -0.720 -0.963
cptycashratio 0.003 0.003
nocptydata -0.187** -0.194**
Misc cptycon 0.153** 0.157**
collcon 0.039 0.032
cpty&collrating 0.001** 0.001**
Own var ownsizelog -0.085 -0.094 -0.093 -0.094
ownroa -22.611* -22.570* -20.952** -20.952**
ownleverage 0.657 0.790 0.855 0.830
owncds -3.993 -7.119 -6.775 -7.786
owncashratio -0.024* -0.046** -0.049** -0.057
Network var pcu 0.007
pcw 0.007
Bank FE Yes Yes No No No No
Currency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 4414 4414 4414 4414 4414 4414
R2 0.541 0.588 0.592 0.545 0.545 0.545
The table shows OLS regression results for reverse repos, excluding deals with CCPs. The dependent variable is haircut and explana-
tory variables are listed in the second column. The first column shows the category of explanatory variable. The columns that are
labeled with numbers display regression coefficients for different explanatory variables. Standard errors (not reported) are clustered
at reporting bank level. One and two stars denote 10% and 5% significance levels respectively.
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Table 1.13: Reverse repo Logistic regressions excluding CCPs
Category Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deal var notional -0.016 0.000 0.017 0.003 0.005 0.005
maturity 0.939** 1.086** 1.032** 0.874** 0.862** 0.862**
Collateral var collrating -0.103** -0.151** -0.148** -0.101** -0.101** -0.101**
collmaturity 0.001 0.043 0.049 0.007 0.007 0.007
corpdebt -0.021 -0.039 -0.036 -0.019 -0.020 -0.020
securitisation 0.439 0.307 0.303 0.434 0.433 0.433
Cpty type brokerdealers -0.298** -0.284* -0.284 -0.297* -0.297* -0.297*
hedgefund 1.431** 1.094** 1.066** 1.420** 1.422** 1.422**
othermanager 0.668 0.501 0.465 0.646 0.645 0.645
insur&pension 0.202 0.107 0.091 0.198 0.198 0.198
cb&govt 0.215 0.256 0.236 0.200 0.199 0.199
other 0.131 -0.030 -0.021 0.149 0.148 0.148
Cpty var cptysize -0.359** -0.343**
cptyroa -26.874 -23.195
cptyrating -0.205** -0.214**
cptyleverage 0.437 0.393
cptycds 1.183 -2.074
cptycashratio 0.029 0.029
nocptydata -2.234** -2.377**
Misc cptycon 1.748** 1.870**
collcon 0.200 0.062
cpty&collrating 0.008** 0.008**
Own var ownsizelog -1.433 -1.556 -1.561 -1.554
ownroa -282.835 -286.001 -295.187* -295.187*
ownleverage 9.285 10.881 10.511 10.657
owncds -58.087 -93.594 -95.545 -89.807
owncashratio -0.775** -1.024** -1.003** -0.957**
Network var pcu -0.041
pcw -0.042
Bank FE Yes Yes No No No No
Currency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 4414 4414 4414 4414 4414 4414
R2 0.709 0.739 0.744 0.714 0.714 0.714
The table shows Logistic regression results for reverse repos, excluding deals with CCPs. The dependent variable is logit-transformed
haircut and explanatory variables are listed in the second column. The first column shows the category of explanatory variable.
The columns that are labeled with numbers display regression coefficients for different explanatory variables. Standard errors (not
reported) are clustered at reporting bank level. One and two stars denote 10% and 5% significance levels respectively.
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Table 1.14: Repo Tobit regressions excluding CCPs
Category Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deal var notional -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003**
maturity 0.057** 0.034** 0.037** 0.060** 0.059** 0.059**
Collateral var collrating -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004**
collmaturity 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
corpdebt 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
securitisation 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003
Cpty type brokerdealers 0.017** 0.016** 0.014** 0.015** 0.015** 0.015**
hedgefund 0.009** -0.022** -0.018** 0.011** 0.010** 0.010**
othermanager -0.028 -0.027 -0.028 -0.029 -0.028 -0.028
insur&pension 0.110** 0.093** 0.094** 0.111** 0.112** 0.112**
cb&govt 0.037** 0.025** 0.023** 0.034** 0.035** 0.035**
other -0.011 -0.015** -0.015** -0.012 -0.012 -0.012
Cpty var cptysize 0.014 0.015
cptyroa 2.420 2.513
cptyrating -0.005** -0.006**
cptyleverage 0.076** 0.074**
cptycds -2.609** -2.599**
cptycashratio 0.007** 0.007**
nocptydata 0.130 0.125
Misc cptycon 0.328 0.372
collcon 0.196** 0.208**
Own var ownsizelog -0.002 0.011 0.018 0.020
ownroa 7.587** 9.811** 8.815* 8.815*
ownleverage -0.009 -0.074 -0.241* -0.198
owncds 9.398** 9.245** 9.529** 11.239**
owncashratio 0.007 0.001 0.008 0.022**
Network var pcu -0.012**
pcw -0.012**
Bank FE Yes Yes No No No No
Currency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 5289 5289 5289 5289 5289 5289
Pseudo R2 -1.00 -0.91 -0.91 -1.00 -1.01 -1.01
The table shows Tobit regression results for reverse repos excluding deals with CCPs, where the Tobit model with truncation at
zero is used. The dependent variable is haircut and explanatory variables are listed in the second column. The first column shows
the category of explanatory variable. The columns that are labeled with numbers display regression coefficients for different
explanatory variables. Standard errors (not reported) are clustered at reporting bank level. One and two stars denote 10% and
5% significance levels respectively.
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Table 1.15: Repo OLS regressions excluding CCPs
Category Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deal var notional 0.005* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004*
maturity 0.049** 0.031** 0.032** 0.049** 0.048** 0.048**
Collateral var collrating -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002**
collmaturity 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
corpdebt -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
securitisation -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Cpty type brokerdealers -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
hedgefund -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
othermanager -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
insur&pension 0.077** 0.072** 0.071** 0.075** 0.076** 0.076**
cb&govt 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
other 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.007 0.007
Cpty var cptysize 0.011** 0.012**
cptyroa 0.568 0.683
cptyrating 0.000 0.000
cptyleverage -0.010 -0.009
cptycds -0.274 -0.441
cptycashratio 0.001 0.001
nocptydata 0.051* 0.052*
Misc cptycon 0.159 0.169
collcon 0.056 0.061
Own var ownsizelog -0.033** -0.042** -0.036** -0.034**
ownroa -6.719** -7.846** -8.278** -8.278**
ownleverage 0.287** 0.337** 0.213** 0.243**
owncds 0.284 -1.041 -0.710 0.461
owncashratio -0.024** -0.030** -0.025** -0.016**
Network var pcu -0.008**
pcw -0.009**
Bank FE Yes Yes No No No No
Currency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 5289 5289 5289 5289 5289 5289
R2 0.372 0.344 0.347 0.377 0.377 0.377
The table shows OLS regression results for repos, excluding deals with CCPs. The dependent variable is haircut and explanatory
variables are listed in the second column. The first column shows the category of explanatory variable. The columns that
are labeled with numbers display regression coefficients for different explanatory variables. Standard errors (not reported) are
clustered at reporting bank level. One and two stars denote 10% and 5% significance levels respectively.
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Table 1.16: Repo Logistic regressions excluding CCPs
Category Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deal var notional 0.050 0.037 0.034 0.047 0.047 0.047
maturity 0.845** 0.575** 0.606** 0.864** 0.831** 0.831**
Collateral var collrating -0.037** -0.039** -0.040** -0.038** -0.037** -0.037**
collmaturity 0.064 0.073* 0.075* 0.067 0.067 0.067
corpdebt 0.018 0.020 0.019 0.015 0.019 0.019
securitisation 0.082** 0.087* 0.101* 0.096** 0.097** 0.097**
Cpty type brokerdealers 0.072 0.052 0.060* 0.088* 0.090* 0.090*
hedgefund 0.164** 0.202** 0.222** 0.170** 0.157** 0.157**
othermanager -0.082 -0.103 -0.095 -0.072 -0.069 -0.069
insur&pension 1.294** 1.223** 1.206** 1.272** 1.283** 1.283**
cb&govt 0.067 0.043 0.046 0.073 0.088 0.088
other 0.036 -0.016 -0.006 0.045 0.043 0.043
Cpty var cptysize 0.115** 0.138**
cptyroa 10.034 11.950
cptyrating -0.011 -0.021
cptyleverage 0.113 0.118
cptycds -6.750* -8.536**
cptycashratio 0.010 0.009
nocptydata 0.708** 0.671**
Misc cptycon 3.851** 4.302**
collcon 0.377 0.418
Own var ownsizelog -0.662** -0.828** -0.593** -0.537**
ownroa -55.784** -66.551** -82.777** -82.777**
ownleverage 4.490** 5.072** 0.409 1.528**
owncds 27.146 11.941 24.392** 68.411**
owncashratio -0.549** -0.627** -0.440** -0.090**
Network var pcu -0.317**
pcw -0.322**
Bank FE Yes Yes No No No No
Currency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 5289 5289 5289 5289 5289 5289
R2 0.545 0.534 0.534 0.545 0.547 0.547
The table shows Logistic regression results for repos, excluding deals with CCPs. The dependent variable is logit-transformed haircut
and explanatory variables are listed in the second column. The first column shows the category of explanatory variable. The columns
that are labeled with numbers display regression coefficients for different explanatory variables. Standard errors (not reported) are
clustered at reporting bank level. One and two stars denote 10% and 5% significance levels respectively.
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Table 1.17: Reverse repo Tobit regressions excluding CCPs, with bank/dealer dummy
Category Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deal var notional 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.004
maturity 0.129* 0.135** 0.117* 0.108 0.124 0.124
Collateral var collrating -0.015** -0.018** -0.018** -0.015** -0.015** -0.015**
collmaturity -0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
corpdebt -0.015 -0.017 -0.018 -0.016 -0.014 -0.014
securitisation 0.022 0.005 0.004 0.020 0.022 0.022
Cpty type bank/dealer -0.084** -0.047 -0.042 -0.082** -0.083** -0.083**
Cpty var cptysize -0.024** -0.024**
cptyroa -3.482 -3.391
cptyrating -0.022** -0.021**
cptyleverage 0.084** 0.081**
cptycds 0.303 -0.002
cptycashratio -0.003 -0.002
nocptydata -0.056 -0.055
Misc cptycon 0.260** 0.255**
collcon 0.101 0.110
cpty&collrating 0.001** 0.001**
Own var ownsizelog -0.110 -0.158* -0.149* -0.158*
ownroa -28.536** -33.163** -20.494* -20.494*
ownleverage 0.466 0.878 1.330** 1.141**
owncds -7.862 -16.135** -13.179* -20.594**
owncashratio -0.156** -0.216** -0.243** -0.302**
Network var pcu 0.053**
pcw 0.054**
Bank FE Yes Yes No No No No
Currency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 4414 4414 4414 4414 4414 4414
Pseudo R2 2.89 2.97 2.97 2.89 2.90 2.90
The table shows Tobit regression results for reverse repos excluding deals with CCPs, where there is only one dummy variable for
counterparty type which takes value of 1 if the counterparty is a bank or broker-dealer, and 0 otherwise. The Tobit model with
truncation at zero is used. The dependent variable is haircut and explanatory variables are listed in the second column. The first
column shows the category of explanatory variable. The columns that are labeled with numbers display regression coefficients for
different explanatory variables. Standard errors (not reported) are clustered at reporting bank level. One and two stars denote 10%
and 5% significance levels respectively.
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Table 1.18: Reverse repo OLS regressions excluding CCPs, with bank/dealer dummy
Category Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deal var notional -0.005 0.000 0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
maturity 0.087** 0.105** 0.094** 0.075* 0.080* 0.080*
Collateral var collrating -0.011** -0.016** -0.016** -0.011** -0.011** -0.011**
collmaturity -0.001 0.004 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
corpdebt -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014
securitisation 0.016 0.008 0.007 0.016 0.016 0.016
Cpty type bank/dealer -0.050 -0.034 -0.032 -0.049 -0.049 -0.049
Cpty var cptysize -0.016 -0.015
cptyroa -3.727* -3.408
cptyrating -0.022** -0.022**
cptyleverage 0.013 0.011
cptycds -1.222** -1.495**
cptycashratio 0.003** 0.003**
nocptydata -0.167** -0.174**
Misc cptycon 0.187** 0.188**
collcon -0.057 -0.060
cpty&collrating 0.001** 0.001**
Own var ownsizelog -0.092 -0.094 -0.093 -0.095
ownroa -27.666** -27.251** -23.857** -23.857**
ownleverage 0.721 0.835 0.972 0.918
owncds -6.639 -10.239* -9.500* -11.616
owncashratio -0.037** -0.065** -0.073** -0.090*
Network var pcu 0.015
pcw 0.015
Bank FE Yes Yes No No No No
Currency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 4414 4414 4414 4414 4414 4414
R2 0.541 0.588 0.592 0.545 0.545 0.545
The table shows OLS regression results for reverse repos excluding deals with CCPs, where there is only one dummy variable for
counterparty type which takes value of 1 if the counterparty is a bank or broker-dealer, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable is
haircut and explanatory variables are listed in the second column. The first column shows the category of explanatory variable. The
columns that are labeled with numbers display regression coefficients for different explanatory variables. Standard errors (not reported)
are clustered at reporting bank level. One and two stars denote 10% and 5% significance levels respectively.
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Table 1.19: Reverse repo Logistic regressions excluding CCPs, with bank/dealer dummy
Category Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deal var notional -0.059 -0.011 0.012 -0.032 -0.035 -0.035
maturity 1.074** 1.251** 1.154** 0.965** 0.977** 0.977**
Collateral var collrating -0.125** -0.179** -0.176** -0.123** -0.123** -0.123**
collmaturity 0.015 0.063 0.068 0.020 0.021 0.021
corpdebt -0.125 -0.129 -0.124 -0.123 -0.122 -0.122
securitisation 0.186 0.083 0.085 0.183 0.185 0.185
Cpty type bank/dealer -0.523 -0.323 -0.310 -0.520 -0.520 -0.520
Cpty var cptysize -0.236 -0.221
cptyroa -35.787 -31.754
cptyrating -0.213** -0.222**
cptyleverage 0.214 0.179
cptycds -5.629 -9.232
cptycashratio 0.012 0.012
nocptydata -1.669** -1.817**
Misc cptycon 2.324** 2.406**
collcon -0.894 -0.994
cpty&collrating 0.010** 0.010**
Own var ownsizelog -1.492 -1.573 -1.568 -1.575
ownroa -339.800* -338.241* -329.157* -329.157*
ownleverage 9.886 11.486 11.851 11.707
owncds -84.317 -128.207 -126.229 -131.892
owncashratio -0.892** -1.234** -1.255** -1.300**
Network var pcu 0.041
pcw 0.041
Bank FE Yes Yes No No No No
Currency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 4414 4414 4414 4414 4414 4414
R2 0.666 0.712 0.718 0.672 0.672 0.672
The table shows Logistic regression results for reverse repos excluding deals with CCPs, where there is only one dummy variable
for counterparty type which takes value of 1 if the counterparty is a bank or broker-dealer, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable is
logit-transformed haircut and explanatory variables are listed in the second column. The first column shows the category of explanatory
variable. The columns that are labeled with numbers display regression coefficients for different explanatory variables. Standard errors
(not reported) are clustered at reporting bank level. One and two stars denote 10% and 5% significance levels respectively.
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Table 1.20: Repo Tobit regressions excluding CCPs, with bank/dealer dummy
Category Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deal var notional -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005**
maturity 0.107** 0.067** 0.069** 0.109** 0.109** 0.109**
Collateral var collrating -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.007** -0.007** -0.007**
collmaturity -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
corpdebt -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
securitisation -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
Cpty type bank/dealer -0.030** -0.022** -0.022** -0.030** -0.030** -0.030**
Cpty var cptysize 0.005 0.005
cptyroa 1.980 2.030
cptyrating -0.015** -0.016**
cptyleverage 0.094** 0.092**
cptycds -3.704** -3.701**
cptycashratio 0.007 0.008
nocptydata -0.045 -0.047
Misc cptycon 0.411* 0.434*
collcon 0.221** 0.230**
Own var ownsizelog -0.015 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
ownroa 3.712* 5.419 5.444 5.444
ownleverage 0.060 -0.006 -0.002 -0.003
owncds 7.043** 6.485** 6.477** 6.431**
owncashratio -0.012* -0.020** -0.020** -0.020**
Network var pcu 0.000
pcw 0.000
Bank FE Yes Yes No No No No
Currency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 5289 5289 5289 5289 5289 5289
Pseudo R2 -1.00 -0.91 -0.91 -1.00 -1.01 -1.01
The table shows Tobit regression results for repos excluding deals with CCPs, where there is only one dummy variable for
counterparty type which takes value of 1 if the counterparty is a bank or broker-dealer, and 0 otherwise. The Tobit model
with truncation at zero is used. The dependent variable is haircut and explanatory variables are listed in the second column.
The first column shows the category of explanatory variable. The columns that are labeled with numbers display regression
coefficients for different explanatory variables. Standard errors (not reported) are clustered at reporting bank level. One and
two stars denote 10% and 5% significance levels respectively.
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Table 1.21: Repo OLS regressions excluding CCPs, with bank/dealer dummy
Category Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deal var notional 0.004* 0.004* 0.003* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004*
maturity 0.083** 0.055** 0.054** 0.080** 0.080** 0.080**
Collateral var collrating -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004**
collmaturity -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
corpdebt -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
securitisation 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003
Cpty type bank/dealer -0.016** -0.014** -0.014** -0.016** -0.016** -0.016**
Cpty var cptysize 0.009** 0.011**
cptyroa 0.577 0.740
cptyrating -0.003 -0.004
cptyleverage -0.012** -0.010*
cptycds -0.652** -0.870*
cptycashratio 0.002 0.001
nocptydata -0.019 -0.015
Misc cptycon 0.160 0.172
collcon 0.077** 0.078**
Own var ownsizelog -0.040** -0.048** -0.046** -0.045**
ownroa -9.656** -11.187** -11.339** -11.339**
ownleverage 0.349** 0.406** 0.362** 0.372**
owncds -1.539 -3.188** -3.068** -2.649**
owncashratio -0.036** -0.042** -0.040** -0.037**
Network var pcu -0.003
pcw -0.003
Bank FE Yes Yes No No No No
Currency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 5289 5289 5289 5289 5289 5289
R2 0.372 0.344 0.347 0.377 0.377 0.377
The table shows OLS regression results for repos excluding deals with CCPs, where there is only one dummy variable for coun-
terparty type which takes value of 1 if the counterparty is a bank or broker-dealer, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable is
haircut and explanatory variables are listed in the second column. The first column shows the category of explanatory variable.
The columns that are labeled with numbers display regression coefficients for different explanatory variables. Standard errors (not
reported) are clustered at reporting bank level. One and two stars denote 10% and 5% significance levels respectively.
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Table 1.22: Repo Logistic regressions excluding CCPs, with bank/dealer dummy
Category Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deal var notional 0.040 0.035 0.029 0.036 0.036 0.036
maturity 1.424** 0.975** 0.985** 1.408** 1.389** 1.389**
Collateral var collrating -0.067** -0.063** -0.063** -0.066** -0.066** -0.066**
collmaturity 0.001 0.024 0.027 0.006 0.005 0.005
corpdebt -0.010 0.003 0.005 -0.010 -0.007 -0.007
securitisation 0.094* 0.121** 0.139** 0.112* 0.111* 0.111*
Cpty type bank/dealer -0.247** -0.223** -0.225** -0.248** -0.251** -0.251**
Cpty var cptysize 0.071* 0.102**
cptyroa 10.765 13.152
cptyrating -0.082** -0.093**
cptyleverage 0.084* 0.102*
cptycds -14.651** -17.250**
cptycashratio 0.016 0.008
nocptydata -0.678 -0.661
Misc cptycon 3.950** 4.323**
collcon 1.522** 1.623**
Own var ownsizelog -0.778** -0.922** -0.762** -0.724**
ownroa -103.133** -117.016** -127.741** -127.741**
ownleverage 5.385** 5.918** 2.763** 3.517**
owncds -0.823 -19.907 -11.416 18.257
owncashratio -0.734** -0.814** -0.688** -0.452**
Network var pcu -0.214**
pcw -0.217**
Bank FE Yes Yes No No No No
Currency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 5289 5289 5289 5289 5289 5289
R2 0.462 0.458 0.461 0.466 0.467 0.467
The table shows Logistic regression results for repos excluding deals with CCPs, where there is only one dummy variable for counterparty
type which takes value of 1 if the counterparty is a bank or broker-dealer, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable is logit-transformed
haircut and explanatory variables are listed in the second column. The first column shows the category of explanatory variable. The
columns that are labeled with numbers display regression coefficients for different explanatory variables. Standard errors (not reported) are
clustered at reporting bank level. One and two stars denote 10% and 5% significance levels respectively.
Table 1.23: Centrality measures summary
Network type Measure Mean
Unweighted in degree 6.60E+01
out degree 6.70E+01
eigenvector centrality -2.23E-01
betweenness 1.57E+04
closeness out 1.87E-01
closeness in 4.81E-02
kcore in 3.67E+00
kcore out 4.17E+00
clustering coefficient 4.12E-02
Weighted in degree (trade number) 1.51E+02
out degree (trade number) 1.93E+03
in degree (value) 4.09E+09
out degree (value) 3.86E+10
eigenvector centrality (trade number) -2.68E-01
eigenvector centrality (value) -2.40E-01
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Chapter 2
Fund Managers and
Misallocation of Capital
Abstract
I study the real effects of benchmarking in the professional fund management indus-
try. Stocks of the productive sector are traded in a competitive equity market. In-
vestors delegate their portfolio decisions to managers whose performance is bench-
marked against an aggregate stock market index. Benchmarking affects market prices
and returns, which consequently changes firms’ investment behaviour. Managers
hedge themselves by tilting their portfolio toward the index which increases the de-
mand and price of the stocks that feature prominently in the index. Higher prices
lead to even more investment by larger firms, generating a positive feedback loop. In
equilibrium there is an inefficient shift towards extreme states in which big sectors
dominate the economy. In presence of benchmarking, index inclusion is preceded by
rise in firm’s investment rate relative to its capital stock, which drops by a smaller
degree after the inclusion.
2.1 Introduction
An essential service that the financial sector provides to foster economic growth is
to reallocate capital to the highest value use (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Absent any
frictions, the market prices should signal the most efficient use of resources, which
leads to highest growth. This paper presents a model in which distortions in the
capital market hinder this crucial role of the financial sector and lead to misallocation
of resources. The delegation of portfolio allocation to professional fund managers
and their incentives play a key role in the misallocation.
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An overwhelming and increasing share of the money invested in financial markets
is managed professionally. Individuals held 47.9% of US equities in 1980 and only
21.5% in 2007 (French, 2008). Not only asset managers matter in financial markets,
they are in fact the marginal investors (He et al., 2016).
Asset managers’ performance is measured relative to benchmarks, which affects
their incentives in investment and ultimately affects market prices. In this paper I
study the interaction between fund managers’ behaviour in equity markets and firms’
investment strategy. Unlike prior literature that only looks at the effect of delegated
portfolio management on prices, I focus on the implications for the real economy.
In my model firms’ investment decisions that lead to their growth is explicitly mod-
elled, and there is a feedback loop between the financial market and the real economy.
Distortions introduced by benchmarking in the equity market can have real effects.
The model, presented in Section 2.2, is as follows. There is a continuous-time
infinite-horizon economy with multiple sectors represented by firms. These firms
have risky productive capital and produce intermediate goods which are then aggre-
gated to consumption good. The firms are equity financed, they invest part of their
earnings to grow and the rest to pay dividends to their shareholders. Shares of the
firms are traded in a competitive stock market. Households who are ultimate claim-
holders cannot invest directly in financial assets and need to entrust their money with
fund managers to invest on their behalf. The behaviour of fund managers is modelled
in a reduced-form way to capture the documented phenomena in asset management
industry. Fund managers care about their reputation which is driven by how their
investments perform relative to a benchmark index.
Absent benchmarking, there is decreasing returns to scale to each individual sector
in the economy. As a firm grows bigger compared to other firms, its returns diminish
relative to its size. Benchmarking introduces a positive feedback between firms’ size
and their investment levels. Since managers care about their performance relative to
a benchmark index, they hedge themselves by tilting their portfolio toward the in-
dex. That increases the demand for stocks of the relatively large firms that feature
prominently in the index, resulting in elevated price levels for these stocks. Firms’ in-
vestment strategy is driven by the neoclassical investment theory, so higher valuations
in the stock markets leads to increased levels of investment which reinforces the firms
growth, making it feature even more prominently in the benchmark, which leads to
higher prices and further investment and so on. Moreover, the composition of the
index may differ from the actual market portfolio. To the extent that the benchmark
and market portfolios are different, individual stocks are disproportionately affected
by benchmarking.
Introducing benchmarking has two effects on the probability distribution of the
states of the world. Firstly, the distribution of the relative size of the firms has fatter
tails with benchmarking, so the economy is more likely to end up in extreme cases
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where one sector dominates. Secondly, different firms can be disproportionately af-
fected by benchmarking, for example if a firm is over-represented in the benchmark,
the distribution shifts towards the states in which it dominates the economy.
Finally I show that benchmarking generates an index inclusion effect on market
valuation and investment strategy of firms. In the run-up to index inclusion, market
valuation relative to capital stock rises substantially. Investment rate also exhibits a
similar pattern that will revert back to downward trend after inclusion. Absent bench-
marking this phenomenon is not observed. I provide suggestive empirical evidence
of the effect of index inclusion on investment rates.
My paper is related to the literature in asset pricing theory that studies the effects
of delegated portfolio management in financial markets. Most of this literature fo-
cuses on the the impact of asset managers on equilibrium prices. A group of papers
study managers contractual incentives in detail. Buffa et al. (2015) examine the joint
determination of fund managers’ contracts and equilibrium asset prices, and show
how benchmarking can be part of optimal contracts in presence of agency frictions.
In their setup a negative relationship between risk and return arises and benchmarking
biases the aggregate market upwards. Basak and Pavlova (2013) include benchmark
directly into institutional investors preferences, and show that demand by these in-
vestors raises prices of the assets in the benchmark and makes them more volatile and
correlated with each other. Also Cuoco and Kaniel (2011) analyse the asset pricing im-
plications of contracts linking the compensation of fund managers to the performance
relative to a benchmark portfolio. They show that symmetric fees have positive effect
on the prices of assets included in the benchmark, while asymmetric fees have more
complex effects that fluctuate stochastically. Other papers in this literature focus on
managers’ reputation concerns (e.g. Dasgupta et al. (2011) and Guerrieri and Kondor
(2012)) and on fund flows (e.g. Vayanos and Woolley (2013) and He and Krishna-
murthy (2012)).
My work is also inspired by the literature in economic growth that examines the
effects of capital misallocation. For example Banerjee and Duflo (2005), Jeong and
Townsend (2007) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009), among others, argue that the mis-
allocation of resources in poor countries explain a large part of the total factor pro-
ductivity gap between rich and poor countries. This argument is substantiated by
evidence documenting significant dispersion in the marginal products of capital in
developing countries. This literature focuses mainly on the role of frictions in credit
market in misallocation of capital. Firms face credit constraints, which are heteroge-
neous across firms. They cannot borrow as much as they like to rent capital. The
credit frictions result in misallocation of capital across firms and sectors and create
inefficiencies. My analysis on the other hand, explores the equity market and how
frictions in this market can distort allocation of resources in the economy.
My paper is also related to the theoretical literature that studies the real effects
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of financial markets that stem from the informational role of market prices. The key
insight of this literature goes back to Hayek (1945), who asserts that market prices pro-
vide an important source of information for decision makers. Market prices aggregate
dispersed information and therefore real decision makers learn from this information
and use it to guide their decision, in turn affecting prices. A recent example in this lit-
erature is Goldstein et al. (2013) who study a model in which investors learn from the
price of a firm’s security and use it to determine how much capital to provide for new
investment, and show that this feedback effect gives rise to trading frenzies. See Bond
et al. (2012) for a comprehensive review of this literature. Unlike the models in this
literature, in my paper prices do not play informational role as there is no informa-
tion asymmetry. However prices affect and guide the investment decisions through
the neoclassical q-theory channel.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2.2, I describe the model.
Section 2.3 describes the solution methodology. Section 2.4 illustrates the equilib-
rium results and Section 2.5 concludes. Additional results, details of the derivations,
complete solution and numerical method are provided in the Appendices.
2.2 The Model
The model consists of firms, households and fund managers. Time is continuous
and runs from zero to infinity. There are N intermediate goods and a perishable
consumption good from which agents obtain utility and is taken as a numeraire. The
components of the models are described with more detail in the subsequent sections.
2.2.1 Firms
There are N firms in the economy, indexed by j = 1, . . . ,N , that produce N differen-
tiated intermediate goods. We can think of these firms as entities representing various
sectors in the economy producing different goods. I use the words “firm” and “sec-
tor” interchangeably in this article to emphasise the point that these firms represent
different industries in the economy. Since the nature and output of these industries
are different, we can expect their means of production to be different as well. The
productive capital used in one industry cannot be directly utilised in another indus-
try. Hence, I assume that capital is specific to sectors. The firm-specificity of capital is
introduced by inserting technological illiquidity to the model. Firms can adjust their
capital holdings by investment or disinvestment, but adjustment is costly.
Each firm owns its productive capital, which is firm-specific, i.e. the capital stock
of firm j , at time t ∈ [0,∞), denoted by k jt , can only be used to produce intermediate
45
good j , at rate
y jt = a
j k jt ,
per unit of time, where a j is the productivity of firm j .
The intermediate-good producers sell their products to a final-good producer. The
final-good producer transforms the intermediate goods into consumption good (or
simply the output), and sells its products to consumers. I assume that the consump-
tion good is produced by a representative firm who behaves competitively. It has a
production function which exhibits constant elasticity of substitution (CES), so con-
sumption good is produced at rate
yt =
 
N∑
j=1

y jt
 s−1
s
! s
s−1
, (2.1)
per unit of time, where s is the elasticity of substitution.
Parameter s in (2.1) captures the degree of substitutability of intermediate goods.
For s =∞ they are perfect substitutes, and for s = 0 there is no substitutability. I
always assume that s has an intermediate value, so that although there is some degree
of substitutability, goods are not perfect substitute. If the productivity of different
sectors are equal, the upshot of imperfect substitutability is that for a given total of
productive capital, the most productive allocation is the one with capital equally al-
located to each sector.
I take the consumption good as numeraire and set its price to one per unit. All
other prices and values are henceforth expressed in terms of the consumption good.
Since the consumption good market is competitive, the final-good producer should
earn zero profit in equilibrium. As a result, we can derive the prices of intermediate
goods in terms of consumption good as
p jt =

yt
y jt
 1
s
.
The focus of this paper is on the intermediate-good producers rather than the final-
good producer. They own their means of production, so they can use their revenue to
finance investment and also to pay dividend to their owners. On the other hand the
final-good producer earns zero profit and can conceptually be thought of as a machine
that converts inputs to outputs. Therefore, I refer to the intermediate-good producers
simply as firms.
Firms can invest to accumulate capital, with negative levels of investment tanta-
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mount to disinvestment. I assume that capital accumulation follows the Ito process
d k jt
k jt
=µ jt d t +σ
j dZ jt , (2.2)
where dZ jt is an exogenous firm-specific Brownian shock and σ
j is the exposure to
this shock, which is constant by assumption. The expected growth rate of capital µ jt
depends on the investment decision of firm j . If firm j invests at rate i jt per unit of
capital (i.e. i jt k
j
t is the total investment rate in terms of the final good), its capital stock
grows at the expected rate
µ jt ≡ i jt −Φ

i jt
−δ j , (2.3)
where δ j is the depreciation rate and Φ (.) is an investment cost function. The func-
tion Φ (.) exhibits convex adjustment costs, and satisfies Φ(0) = 0, Φ′ > 0, and Φ′′ > 0.
The existence of convex adjustment costs reflects technological illiquidity, i.e. the
cost due to converting the output to new capital and vice versa.
The technological illiquidity is related to the firm-specificity of capital. If invest-
ment technology was fully liquid (i.e. Φ (i) = 0,∀i ), firms could adjust their level of
capital without any cost, which could result in infinite investment or disinvestment
rates. Adjustment costs ensure that investment rates are always finite, and therefore
each firm’s capital stock only changes smoothly across time.
The Brownian shocks dZ jt , j = 1, . . . ,N , are independent across firms. If we think
of k jt as efficiency units rather than physical units of capital, we can interpret dZ
j
t
as shocks to how effective the capital is. Alternatively we could model the shocks
directly as factor productivity shocks. The alternative formulation generates isomor-
phic results, but for analytical simplicity the former formulation is chosen.1
2.2.2 Capital Market
I assume that the firms described in Section 2.2.1 are equity financed only. Investors
can trade their shares in a competitive stock market. A shareholder can profit from
holding a stock in two ways, changes in the value of the firm (capital gains) and divi-
dends. Consider firm j = 1, . . . ,N which produces intermediate output y jt . The gross
revenue generated by this firm from selling its product to the final-good producer is
y jt p
j
t = a
j k jt p
j
t ,
1The alternative formulation is to assume that y jt = a
j
t κ
j
t , where a
j
t is factor productivity which follows
da jt = a
j
t σ
j dZ jt , and κ is now physical capital rather than efficiency units and evolves deterministically.
For details of this formulation see Seyedan (2015).
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per unit of time. Therefore, if it invests at rate i jt per unit of capital, the net profit
that is available to be distributed as dividend to shareholders is
a j k jt p
j
t − i jt k jt ,
per unit of time.2 Let V jt denote the total market value of firm j . Hence, the instan-
taneous rate of return from investing in its shares can be written as
d r jk ,t =
dV jt
V jt
+
a j k jt p
j
t − i jt k jt
V jt
d t . (2.4)
The first term in (2.4) is the shareholders’ capital gains rate due to changes in the
market value of the firm, and the second term is the dividend yield distributed by
firm j .
At each point in time firm j holds k jt in physical assets, and its market value is
V jt . It is useful to define q
j
t as
q jt ≡ V
j
t
k jt
, (2.5)
which is essentially the average Tobin’s q of firm j . Since capital is encapsulated
within firms, we can interpret q jt as the market price of type j capital. Trading activ-
ity in the stock market determines V jt and in turn q
j
t . Let’s postulate the following
endogenous process for q jt
d q jt
q jt
=µ jq ,t d t +

σ jq ,t
′
dZt , (2.6)
where dZt =

dZ1t · · · dZNt
′ is the N × 1 vector of independent Brownian shocks,
and
σ jq ,t =

σ j 1q ,t · · · σ j jq ,t · · · σ j Nq ,t
′
(2.7)
is the vector of the exposures of price q jt to the shocks. The drift term µ
j
q ,t and the
volatility vector σ jq ,t are endogenous objects and are determined in equilibrium. As
it is evident in formulation (2.7), the price of the firm j capital, q jt , can be exposed to
shocks to other firms as well.
The definition of q jt in (2.5) means that the market value of firm j can be written as
V jt = q
j
t k
j
t , so the capital gains term dV
j
t /V
j
t in (2.4) can be derived by Ito’s Lemma
using the postulated q jt process (2.6) and the law of motion of k
j
t in (2.2). Doing so,
2In theory there is no restriction on dividends to be positive. Negative values can be interpreted as
capital injections by shareholders to finance investment.
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we can rewrite the returns from holding stock j in (2.4) as
d r jk ,t =µ
j
k ,t d t +

σ jk ,t
′
dZt , (2.8)
where
µ jk ,t =µ
j
t +µ
j
q ,t +σ
jσ j jq ,t +
a j p jt − i jt
q jt
, (2.9)
and
σ jk ,t =

σ j 1q ,t
...
σ j jq ,t +σ j
...
σ j Nq ,t

. (2.10)
The term µ jk ,t in (2.8) is the instantaneous expected return from holding shares in
firm j . Its components are shown in (2.9). The last term is the dividend yield and is
the same as in (2.4), now expressed in terms of q jt . The terms µ
j
t and µ
j
q ,t capture the
expected growth rates in stock and value of capital respectively. Finally, the Ito-term
σ jσ j jq ,t reflects the covariance between the exogenous volatility of the capital stock of
firm j and its endogenous price risk.
The volatility vector in (2.8) represents the total risk from holding shares in firm
j . By assumption, shocks to the stock of capital are independent across firms, hence
the capital stock of firm j is only affected by dZ jt , with σ
j capturing the size of this
exposure. Hence σ j is the fundamental volatility, which is constant by assumption.
However, firms are exposed to shocks to other firms through the market prices. These
exposures are summarised in σ jq ,t . Therefore, as (2.10) shows the total risk is the sum
of the fundamental volatility and the endogenous, market-induced volatility.
To succinctly represent the investment opportunity set in the stock market, we
can collect all the individual stock returns d r jk ,t , j = 1, . . . ,N , in a vector of returns
denoted by d rk ,t , such that
d rk ,t =µk ,t d t +σk ,t
′dZt , (2.11)
where
µk ,t =

µ1k ,t · · · µ jk ,t · · · µNk ,t
′
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is the vector of expected returns and
σk ,t =

σ1k ,t · · · σ jk ,t · · · σNk ,t

is the volatility matrix. Each element in the N ×N matrix σk ,t is a column vector as
demonstrated in (2.10).
In addition to the risky assets described above, there is a risk-free asset in the econ-
omy. We can make either of the two following assumptions about the supply of the
risk-free asset. We can presume that the risk-free asset is in zero net supply and the
risk-free rate is determined in equilibrium. Alternatively we can assume that the sup-
ply is elastic at an exogenously fixed rate. This can be the case if the economy in
question is a small open economy.
The main results of this paper are not sensitive to the assumption about the risk-
free rate. In the Appendices, I analyse the implication of each assumption on the
solution and results.
2.2.3 Investment
The only decision taken within the firms in this model is investment. The firms’
decision makers (managers) are not modelled explicitly because it is assumed that there
is no conflict of interest between shareholders and managers, and hence unmodelled
managers behave in the best interest of their shareholders. For example we can assume
that they own a fraction of the firm they are running and hence their incentives are
aligned with rest of the shareholders.
Therefore the investment decision at each point in time boils down to maximising
the rate of return from holding shares expressed in (2.8). The investment rate affects
the expected return and is chosen to solve
max
i j
µ jk ,t .
This objective pins down the investment choice at each moment in the following way
Φ′
 
i j

= 1− 1
q jt
. (2.12)
This condition shows that investment solely depends on the current price of capital,
i jt = i

q jt

. (2.13)
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In addition, higher prices lead to more investment as
i ′ (q) = 1
Φ′′ (i)
1
q2
=
Φ′ (i)2
Φ′′ (i)
> 0. (2.14)
The optimal investment rule (2.13) is incorporated in the expressions for the return
on capital, d r jk ,t , hereafter.
We defined q jt in (2.5) as Tobin’s q of firm j (average q). Hayashi (1982) laid
out conditions under which marginal q and average q are equal, which hold in this
model.3 Hence, as it is evident in (2.12), investment rate of firm j is pinned down
solely by q jt .
In this study I use a quadratic adjustment cost function, i.e.
Φ (i) =
κ
2
i2,
where κ controls the degree of technological illiquidity. Using this cost function in
(2.12), we can solve for the optimal investment function as
i
 
q j

=
1
κ

1− 1
q j

.
2.2.4 Agents
There are two groups of agents in the economy, a continuum one of households and
fund managers. Each group can be viewed as a representative agent. Households
derive utility from consuming the consumption good. Their objective is to maximise
the expected utility of their life-time consumption, expressed by the utility function
E
ˆ ∞
0
e−βt log (ct )d t

. (2.15)
Households are the ultimate claim-holders to all the firms in the economy. They
invest their wealth in the capital market as explained below.
There is a friction in the capital market though, which gives rise to the second
group of agents, fund managers. Households cannot invest in the capital market di-
rectly, but they delegate their investment decision to fund managers. Fund managers
raise money from households and invest on their behalf in a portfolio of risky and
risk-free assets.
The delegation of portfolio allocation decision can take two forms depending
3Marginal q is the marginal value of a unit of capital, i.e. ∂ V∂ k . The conditions concern homogeneity of
production function and adjustment cost function, both of which are satisfied in this model.
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on our assumption. In the full-delegation case, households entrust all their finan-
cial wealth to fund managers and only make consumption decision. Fund managers
then allocate their endowment to a portfolio of risky assets and the risk-free asset.
In the partial-delegation case, in addition to consumption choice, households decide
on the fraction of wealth allocated to the risk-free asset and funds. Fund managers
then allocate the amount raised as before. For clarity and brevity, in the main text I
adhere to the simplest case where all the financial decisions are delegated. In this case,
if a consumer’s wealth is denoted by wt and the fund she has invested her wealth in
returns d Rt over period d t , her wealth evolves according to
d wt = wt d Rt − ct d t . (2.16)
I explore the partial delegation case in Appendix 2.6.3. The results are very similar
nonetheless.
Although fund managers are instrumental in choosing the investment portfolio
as described further below, it is assumed that their share of aggregate consumption is
negligible relative to the household sector. In other words we can ignore their con-
sumption decision and assume that they do not consume goods. This formulation
which is convenient when clearing the goods market is borrowed from He and Kr-
ishnamurthy (2014). Hence, we do not have to keep track of the fund managers’
consumption decisions and the distribution of wealth between households and man-
agers, which makes the model more tractable and enables us to focus on the essence
of this analysis, which is the capital allocation across sectors.
A fund manager chooses portfolio zt ≡

z1t · · · zNt
′ of stocks at each time t , where
z jt denotes the fraction of fund’s resources invested in stock j . The remaining re-
sources are invested in the risk-free asset. Therefore the return on the fund is
d Rt = zt
′d rk ,t +
 
1− zt ′1

rt d t . (2.17)
The behaviour of fund managers is modelled in a reduced form to capture the
benchmarking phenomenon, which is common practice to evaluate performance in
the financial industry. The intention is to capture two features of fund management
practice: fund flows depend on past performance and hence managers care about their
performance, and performance is evaluated relative to a benchmark. As described
above, we ignore their consumption, and assume that fund managers are motivated
by their “reputation”, which is affected by their performance relative to a benchmark
portfolio. The formulation using reputation is adopted from He and Krishnamurthy
(2014). Formally, managers choose their portfolio zt to maximise their future repu-
tation εt . A given fund manager may also “die” at Poisson intensity η. Therefore, the
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objective of a manager is to maximise
E
ˆ ∞
0
e−ηt log (εt )d t

. (2.18)
The evolution of a manager’s reputation depends on the performance of the manager
relative to the benchmark portfolioωb ,t . The law of motion of εt is
dεt
εt
= d Rt −τ ωb ,t ′d rk ,t −ηd t , (2.19)
where τ is the sensitivity of the reputation to the return on the benchmark port-
folio, and d Rt is the rate of return delivered by the manager expressed in (2.17).
The first two terms in (2.19) capture the return of the fund relative to the bench-
mark portfolio return and the last term captures the exit rate of managers (or alter-
natively interpreted, the rate at which reputation decays). The benchmark portfolio
ωb ,t ≡

ω1b ,t · · · ωNb ,t
′
is an exogenously given portfolio. In Section 2.4.1 I discuss
examples of different benchmark portfolios.
2.2.5 Equilibrium
Since there is a continuum of households with unit mass, individual wealth wt also
denotes aggregate wealth. Moreover, it is shown later that all households consume the
same fraction of their wealth, therefore individual consumption ct denotes aggregate
consumption as well.4 Similarly for fund managers, zt represents aggregate portfolio
chosen by the fund industry.
We can assume a representative household who has wealth wt and chooses con-
sumption ct to maximise utility (2.15) subject to dynamic budget constraint (2.16).
The representative household entrusts its wealth to a representative fund manager
who invests in a portfolio zt of risky assets and the risk-free asset on behalf of the
households, which delivers return d Rt in (2.17). The representative manager’s objec-
tive is to maximise her expected future reputation expressed in (2.18), subject to the
law of motion of reputation (2.19).
For any given initial condition on the firms’ capital stock
¦
k j0 > 0 : j = 1, . . . ,N
©
,
an equilibrium is described by a set of stochastic processes: the market prices of capital
q j > 0 : j = 1, . . . ,N
	
, interest rate r , wealth process w ≥ 0, investment decisions
i j > 0 : j = 1, . . . ,N
	
, portfolio choice z by fund managers, and consumption choice
c by households, such that
1. each agent maximises her objective function, taking prices as given, and
2. markets for consumption good and capital clear, i.e.
4The CRRA utility function ensures this property.
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ct =
∑
j

a j p jt − i jt

k jt , (2.20)
z jt =
q jt k
j
t
wt
, j = 1, . . . ,N . (2.21)
Market clearing for the risk-free asset follows from Walras’ Law.
As illustrated in Section 2.2.2, each firm j = 1, . . . ,N distributes

a j p jt − i jt

k jt
in terms of consumption good as dividends to shareholders . Good market clearing
condition (2.20) indicates that aggregate household consumption should equate the
sum of dividends received by households.
The total wealth entrusted to fund managers is wt and they invest a fraction z
j
t
of it in shares of firm j . The capital market clearing condition (2.21) says that z jt wt
should be equal to the total market value of firm j , i.e. V jt = q
j
t k
j
t .
2.3 Solution Methodology
All agents in the economy behave competitively, they take prices as given and act ac-
cordingly. Knowing prices fully characterises the behaviour of agents. In this section
first I define a set of state variables. Next, I solve for all the equilibrium outcome
variables in terms of the prices and the state variables. I then solve for a Markov equi-
librium where prices are functions of the state variables.
To describe the state of the economy, it is enough to inspect how capital is allo-
cated across firms. In addition, since the technology is linear in all firms, it is enough
to inspect the ratio of capital across firms. Therefore, I normalise the capital stock
of all firms by the level of capital stock in one of the firms, firm N , to form a state
variable. Hence, to describe the state of the economy, we need N − 1 state variables.
I conjecture and later verify that the equilibrium can be derived in terms of
v it = log

k it
kNt

i = 1, . . . ,N − 1. (2.22)
I denote the collection of state variables by vt . For notational convenience, it is useful
to define vNt ≡ 0 for all t .
We can easily derive the law of motion of the state variables by applying Ito’s
Lemma to the dynamics of firm capital described in (2.2) as
d v it =µ
i
v,t d t +σ
i dZ it −σN dZNt , i = 1, . . . ,N − 1, (2.23)
where µiv,t ≡µit −µNt − 12

σ i 2−σN 2 by Ito’s Lemma.
To characterise the equilibrium, first I solve for all the equilibrium outcome vari-
ables in terms of the state variables and q j , j = 1, . . . ,N , which in turn are functions
54
of the state variables themselves, i.e.
q jt = q
j (vt ) , j = 1, . . . ,N ,
and are conjectured to be twice continuously differentiable. The dynamics of these
prices are linked to the law of motion of vt in (2.23) by Ito’s Lemma as described in
Appendix 2.6.2. Finally, I derive a system of partial differential equations for q j s by
imposing the equilibrium conditions. This system is solved numerically to find q j s
which are used to compute all other desired equilibrium quantities.
The details of the solution are presented in Appendix 2.6.2. The next section will
review the key results and implications. In particular I focus on two examples with 2
and 3 sectors in the economy.
2.4 Equilibrium Result
Let’s denote the variance-covariance matrix of returns with Σt = σk ,t
′σk ,t . If there is
no benchmarking, i.e. τ = 0, the optimal portfolio chosen by managers is
zt =Σt
−1  µk ,t − rt 1 , (2.24)
which is a simple mean-variance portfolio. Given the logarithmic utility of house-
holds, this is the same portfolio they would have chosen if they take the allocation
decision themselves. In this case, fund managers do not introduce any distortion in
the capital allocation.
With benchmarking the optimal portfolio chosen by fund manager is
zt =Σt
−1  µk ,t − rt 1+τωb ,t . (2.25)
Managers want to tilt their portfolio toward the benchmark and away from the opti-
mal portfolio in terms of the risk-return trade-off. The second term of the portfolio
is a hedging component against the risk of underperforming the benchmark.
Ultimately fund managers should hold the entire supply of risky assets in the
economy and clear the capital market. For simplicity let’s denote the market clear-
ing portfolio of risky assets with ωm,t . Hence the capital market clearing condition
becomes
zt =ωm,t . (2.26)
To make the analysis more interesting, I assume that ωm and ωb are different.
This can be because ωm is the market portfolio and ωb is an index that differs from
it, for example it does not include some stocks, or has different weights on stocks
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relative to the market (similar to Vayanos and Woolley (2013)). Alternatively, suppose
that there are unmodelled investors (e.g. firm managers) that behave as buy-and-hold
investors for reasons such as corporate-control, hedging, or other considerations. In
this case, we can interpretωm as the free-float portfolio, that is the residual supply left
from buy-and-hold investors, andωb is the aggregate market index against which the
managers’ performance is benchmarked (similar to Buffa et al. (2015)). In either case
the results are similar, and for clarity I take the first assumption, i.e. ωm is the market
portfolio and ωb is an arbitrary index against which the managers’ performance is
benchmarked.
To the extent that ωb and ωm are different, individual stocks are disproportion-
ately affected by benchmarking. Managers want to tilt their portfolio toward the
benchmark. Prices, expected returns and covariances should alter to clear the capi-
tal market. These changes affect firms investment policies and their relative size, and
changes the allocation of resources in the economy. In the next two sections I look
at two specific examples to illustrate how these changes affect the economy. Section
2.4.1 examines an economy with two sectors in which ωb and ωm are different and
the composition of the index is constant in terms of the share of each sector. Section
2.4.2 explores an economy with three sectors in which the index is composed of the
two largest firms by market capitalisation at each point in time.
2.4.1 Two-Sector Economy
In this section I consider an economy with two firms, indexed by j = 1,2. To focus on
the role of benchmarking, I assume all parameters are symmetric, i.e. both firms have
the same productivity parameter, fundamental volatility, etc. The only difference is
that the stock of firm 1 is under-represented in the benchmark portfolio and the stock
of firm 2 is over-represented. To be specific, the benchmark index is composed of
50% of the value of firm 1, and 100% of firm 2. Although the composition of the
index is constant across time in terms of the share of each sector, the weights change
continuously due to fluctuations in the market values. If either of the firms is big
enough it can dominate the index.
Figure 2.1 shows the probability density function (pdf) of the state variable v1 =
log
 
K1/K2

, which captures the relative size of the sectors. I have used the Kol-
mogorov Forward Equation to derive the stationary distribution as described with
more detail in Appendix 2.6.2. Since the parameters are symmetric and both sectors
are equally productive, the maximum output is produced when K1 = K2, i.e. v1 = 0.
When there is no benchmarking (i.e. τ = 0), the distribution is bell-shaped and peaks
at v1 = 0. Introducing benchmarking (i.e. τ > 0) has two effects on the probability
distribution. First, the distribution of the relative size of the firms has fatter tails with
benchmarking, so the economy is more likely to end up in extreme cases where one
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sector dominates. Second, due to the fact that different firms are disproportionately
affected by benchmarking and one is over-represented in the benchmark, the distri-
bution shifts towards the state in which it dominates the economy (firm 2 in this
example). In other words, it is more probable that firm 2 predominate in this econ-
omy which corresponds to low values of the state variable (low values of v1 occur
when K2 is much higher than K1).
Relative to the case with no benchmarking, both tails are fatter (first effect, due to
benchmarking per se), and the left tail is fatter because firm 2 is over-represented in
the benchmark so it is more likely to be in states in which this sector dominates the
economy (second effect, due to the composition of the benchmark).
The reason behind the change in distribution is clear when we inspect relative
prices and investment in different sectors in Figure 2.2. Benchmarking results in over-
pricing and over-investment in the sector that constitutes big part of the market, and
that increases the probability of extreme outcomes. Bigger sectors attract more in-
vestment and grow even bigger consequently. The magnitude of welfare loss due to
misallocation in my simulations is in the order of 1% depending on the parameter
values.
The left panel of Figure 2.2 shows the ratio of the prices of capital. Expectedly,
as one sector grows bigger, the relative price of capital in that sector falls. However,
benchmarking tilts the relative prices such that the firm with higher contribution to
the index has higher relative price compared to the equilibrium without benchmark-
ing. This would happen more often for the stock with over-representation in the
index. The right panel in Figure 2.2 shows the corresponding picture of firms’ inter-
nal investment. Since investment is strictly increasing in q , we see the same picture
in relative investment of the firms. A firm with high representation in the index ac-
cumulates capital at a rate higher than what it would have achieved in a regime with
no benchmarking.
2.4.2 Three-Sector Economy
In this section I consider an economy with three firms, indexed by j = 1,2,3. As
in the previous section all parameters are symmetric, i.e. firms have the same pro-
ductivity parameter, fundamental volatility, etc. The performance of the managers is
benchmarked against an index which is constructed as follows: at each point in time
the two largest firms by market capitalisation are included in the index and the small-
est firm is excluded from the index. The primary purpose of this exercise is to see
how inclusion in the index affects the firm characteristics and behaviour.
Figure 2.3 demonstrates the investment rate of a firm around the index inclusion.
The horizontal axis shows the ratio of capital stock to the starting amount of capital
stock (hence the initial value being 1 on the horizontal axis). The vertical axis shows
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Figure 2.1: Stationary probability distribution of the state variable v1 = log

K1
K2

with bench-
marking in solid blue and without in dashed-dotted red. All parameters are symmetric, but the
benchmark index is composed of 50% of the value of firm 1, and 100% of firm 2.
investment rate (i.e. the total investment normalised by capital stock at each point).
The vertical dashed-dotted line marks the index inclusion event. To the left of this
line stock 1 is not in the index and to the right it is, since it becomes large enough in
terms of the market capitalisation.5
Top panel in Figure 2.3, depicts an economy in which there is benchmarking (τ >
0). As it is evident in this panel, benchmarking introduces an index inclusion effect on
the investment behaviour of the firm. Prior to inclusion, firm increases its investment
rate dramatically. Once the firm is included in the index, the investment rate gradually
drops as now the firm is a bigger firm and fundamental forces drive the investment
rate down. The bottom panel shows the corresponding graph for an economy where
there is no benchmarking, i.e. τ = 0. In this economy the investment rate declines
monotonically with increase in the size of the firm.
Figure 2.4 demonstrates the changes in investment rates of firms around inclusion
in S&P 500 index. The details of the data used to draw these figures are described
in Appendix 2.6.4. In the top panel, quarter 0 corresponds to the quarter in which
the stock is included in the index, and I inspect the investment rate in a window of
10 quarters before and after the inclusion. The bottom panel shows investment rate
versus the ratio of the capital stock to the initial level of capital stock. We can see in
5In Figure 2.3 the ratio of the capital stock of the other two firms is held constant at 1, i.e. the second
state variable v2 = log
 
v2/v3

is held constant in this graph at 0 throughout.
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Figure 2.2: The left panel plots the ratio of the price of firm 1 capital to firm 2 capital, and the
right panel the difference between the investment rates of the two firms, with benchmarking in
solid blue, and without in dashed-dotted red. All parameters are symmetric, but the benchmark
index is composed of 50% of the value of firm 1, and 100% of firm 2.
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Figure 2.3: Investment rate around index inclusion with benchmarking in the top panel, and
without in the bottom panel. The horizontal axis shows the capital stock normalised by the
initial amount (hence the initial value of 1). The vertical dashed-dotted line marks the index
inclusion event. There are three firms in the economy with symmetric parameters, and the
index is composed of the two largest firms in terms of market capitalisation. The ratio of the
capital stock of the other two firms is held constant at 1, i.e. v2 = log
 
v2/v3

= 0.
60
these graphs that investment rate around the index inclusion demonstrates an increase
followed by a smaller decrease, which is similar to the behaviour shown in the model
with benchmarking in Figure 2.3. The mechanism through which index inclusion af-
fects the investment policy in the model is the following: market prices are affected by
fund managers who care about the index because their performance is benchmarked
against it, and these market prices in turn guide corporate investment policy. This
figure provides suggestive evidence that being in an index can affect firms’ investment
behaviour.
2.5 Conclusion
I present a model of delegated asset management in a fully stochastic multi-sector pro-
duction economy, and I show that benchmarking against an index in financial market
has real effects in terms of the capital allocation to different sectors in the economy. I
study the implications of the model for prices and capital allocation in general and also
I examine examples of the effects of index composition in economies with two and
three sectors in particular. Benchmarking generates a positive feedback loop from the
market prices to firm’s size and investment strategy, and creates an inefficient shift to-
wards extreme states in which big sectors dominate the economy. In addition I show
that benchmarking generates an index inclusion effect. Index inclusion event is pre-
ceded by rise in firm’s valuation and investment rate relative to its capital stock, which
drops by a smaller degree after the inclusion. I provide suggestive empirical evidence
of the effect of index inclusion on investment rates.
2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Additional Results
In all of the figures shown in this section, the left panel refers to an economy with
endogenous interest rate and zero net supply of the risk-free asset and the right panel
refers to an economy with an exogenously fixed interest rate with the risk-free asset
in elastic supply.
Figure 2.5 demonstrates prices and interest rate in the economy described in Sec-
tion 2.4.1 under two assumptions: endogenous interest rate (left) and exogenous in-
terest rate (right), where interest rate is fixed at r = 3.3%. Panel A shows changes in
the interest rate versus the state variable v1 = log
 
K1/K2

. The risk-free asset is in
zero net supply in the left Panel, therefore the interest rate should adjust to preclude
aggregate borrowing and lending. With intermediate levels of v1, return to capital is
high (as demonstrated in Figure 2.7), so agents are willing to borrow to invest in the
stock market. This fact raises interest rate for intermediate levels v1. Moreover, in
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Figure 2.4: Investment rate around inclusion in S&P 500 index, from a sample of 103 index
inclusions described in Appendix 2.6.4. The top panel plots the investment rate against time
in a window of 10 quarters before and after inclusion, where quarter 0 corresponds to the
quarter in which a firm is included in the index. The bottom panel plots investment rate versus
the capital stock normalised by the initial amount (hence the initial value of 1). The vertical
dashed-dotted line marks the index inclusion event.
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the economy with benchmarking interest rate takes higher values for all levels of v1.
In the right panel the interest rate is exogenously fixed at r = 3.3% and the risk-free
asset has elastic supply at this rate.
Panel B in Figure 2.5 shows changes in prices of capital in the two firms. With en-
dogenous risk-free rate, benchmarking results in over-valuation for a firm that domi-
nates the index and under-valuation for a firm that is dominated. As discussed in Sec-
tion 2.4.1 these over-valuation and under-valuation feed into the investment strategies
of firms and make big firms grow bigger and small firms become smaller.
With exogenous interest rate, benchmarking always increases the prices of the
risky assets due to shift from risk-free asset to the risky assets which is a result of the
fact that the index is composed of the risky assets only. However increase in the price
of an asset is the highest when the asset dominates the index.
Figure 2.6 illustrates the drift on the capital stock of each firm µ j . The overall
shape of the drift on capital is dictated by the fundamental decreasing returns to scale
to each sector in the economy. As the capital stock of a firm grows bigger compared
to other firms, its returns diminish relative to its size, which reduces the average q
and thereby reduces the investment and drift on capital. On the other hand, if the
capital stock becomes small relative to other sectors, the opposite occurs. As Figure
2.6 shows, benchmarking acts as a counterbalance to this fundamental force and intro-
duces a positive feedback between firms’ size and their investment levels. Therefore,
with endogenous risk-free rate benchmarking results in over-valuation for a firm that
dominates the index and under-valuation for a firm that is dominated which then feed
into the investment strategies and ultimately affect the growth rate of capital in firms.
With exogenous interest rate, benchmarking always increases the prices of the
risky assets due to shift from the risk-free asset to the risky assets as described before,
which leads to increase in the growth rate of capital stock due to higher investment
levels.
Figure 2.7 illustrates the return on capital for the two firms. The effect of bench-
marking on the return on capital is somewhat the mirror image of the effect on the
prices shown in Figure 2.5. That’s because the higher return in capital is associated
with lower price of capital and vice versa.
Panel A in Figure 2.8 illustrates the volatility of return on capital for both firms
i.e. |σ jk |. As evident in the left panel with endogenous interest rate, benchmarking
reduces return volatility once the firm is dominant in the benchmark and increases
it otherwise. Similar to the effect on prices, in presence of exogenous interest rate
benchmarking always increases the volatilities of risky assets due to shift from risk-
free asset to the risky assets as described above.
Panel B in Figure 2.8 shows the correlation between the return on capital of the
two firms. With both endogenous and exogenous rates, benchmarking reduces the
correlation between the returns.
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(B) Prices of Capital
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Figure 2.5: Prices of capital and interest rate in a two-sector economy with benchmarking in
solid blue and without in dashed-dotted red, under two assumptions: endogenous interest rate
on the left and exogenous interest rate on the right, where interest rate is fixed at r = 3.3%.
Panel A plots the interest rate and panel B plots the price of capital of the two firms. All
parameters are symmetric, but the benchmark index is composed of 50% of the value of firm
1, and 100% of firm 2.
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Figure 2.6: Growth rate of capital in a two-sector economy with benchmarking in solid blue
and without in dashed-dotted red, under two assumptions: endogenous interest rate on the left
and exogenous interest rate on the right. All parameters are symmetric, but the benchmark
index is composed of 50% of the value of firm 1, and 100% of firm 2.
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Figure 2.7: Return on capital in a two-sector economy with benchmarking in solid blue and
without in dashed-dotted red, under two assumptions: endogenous interest rate on the left and
exogenous interest rate on the right. All parameters are symmetric, but the benchmark index
is composed of 50% of the value of firm 1, and 100% of firm 2.
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(B) Correlation between the Return on Capital of Firms 1 and 2
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Figure 2.8: Volatility of return on capital and correlation between the returns in a two-sector
economy with benchmarking in solid blue and without in dashed-dotted red, under two as-
sumptions: endogenous interest rate on the left and exogenous interest rate on the right. Panel
A plots the volatility of return on capital for each firm, and panel B plots the correlation be-
tween the two returns. All parameters are symmetric, but the benchmark index is composed
of 50% of the value of firm 1, and 100% of firm 2.
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2.6.2 Solution
Although state variable is vt , for notational convenience it is useful to define
ψ jt = e
v jt =
k jt
kNt
, j = 1, . . . ,N . (2.27)
which has a one-to-one relationship with vt . I will express equilibrium conditions in
terms of ψt , which is equivalent to expressing them in terms of vt .
I will drop the subscript t from the variables in most of what follows for brevity.
Agents’ Optimisation
When households delegate all their financial decisions to managers, they only choose
their consumption level. Given the logarithmic utility, the consumption choice is
very simple, and the optimal consumption is
ct =βwt . (2.28)
Fund managers choose zt to maximise (2.18) subject to (2.19). Because of logarith-
mic utility, the value function of the representative fund manager is of the form
V m =
1
η
log (ε)︸ ︷︷ ︸
J m (ε)
+H m ,
where H m depends only on aggregate state. HJB equation is
max
z
(DV m + log (ε))−ηV m = 0,
where D is the Dynkin operator.6 The optimal portfolio z is given by
argmax
z
DV m = argmax
z
DJ m .
Since J m (ε) = 1η log (ε), we can use Ito’s Lemma and the law of motion of ε in
(2.19), substituting d Rt from (2.17) to obtain
DJ m = 1
η

z ′ (µk − r 1)+ r −τω′bµk −η− 12 (z −τωb )
′σ ′kσk (z −τωb )

.
Taking first-order condition of DJ m with respect to z yields (2.25).
6The Dynkin operator is the drift term of a process S, when applying Ito’s Lemma to derive d S.
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Market Clearing Conditions
In this section I rewrite the market clearing conditions for consumption and capital in
terms of ψ and combine them with optimality conditions. Since ψ is directly linked
to the state variables via (2.27), this is equivalent to writing the conditions in terms of
the state variables.
First, divide both sides of (2.20) by kNt to derive
D (ψ) =
ct
kNt
, (2.29)
where D (ψ) ≡ ∑ j a j p jt − i jt ψ jt . Note that D is a function of ψ only. Firstly,
investment is only function of q as shown in (2.13) which in our Markov equilibrium
is function of ψ (or v) itself. Secondly, intermediate good prices p jt , j = 1, . . . ,N are
also pinned down by ψ according to
p jt =

f (ψt )
α jψ jt
 1
s
where α j ≡ a jaN , and
f (ψ)≡
∑
j

α jψ jt
 s−1
s
 ss−1 ,
which is obtained by dividing both sides of (2.1) by yNt = a
N kNt .
Next, we can combine the consumption market clearing (2.29) and the optimal
consumption rule (2.28) to derive
wt
kNt
=
D (ψt )
β
. (2.30)
The left-hand side of (2.30) is the aggregate financial wealth in the economy nor-
malised by the level of capital in firm N . We will use this equation later in the capital
market clearing condition.
Next, let’s turn our attention to the capital market clearing condition in (2.21). I
have expressed the capital market clearing condition in terms of the market portfolio
ωm,t . The share of wealth invested in firm j is q
j
t k
j
t /wt , therefore in the equilibrium
market portfolio we should have
ω jm,t =
q jt k
j
t
wt
, j = 1, . . . ,N . (2.31)
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Normalising the numerator and denominator in the right-hand side of (2.31), we ob-
tain
ω jm,t =
q jt ψ
j
t
wt/k
N
t
,
which together with (2.30) characterises the market portfolio in terms of the state
variables as
ωm (ψ) =
β
D (ψt )

q1tψ
1
t
...
qNt ψ
N
t
 . (2.32)
PDEs
In this section I combine the equilibrium conditions to derive a system of partial
differential equations that determines prices q j , j = 1, . . . ,N in terms of the state vari-
ables v i , i = 1, . . . ,N − 1. First let’s rewrite the optimal portfolio allocation (2.25)
as
µk =Σ (ωm −τωb )+ r 1, (2.33)
where I have imposed the capital market clearing condition (2.26). Equation (2.33)
characterises a system of N PDEs. To see this, note thatµk andΣ= σ
′
kσk are linked to
µq and σq which are given below in terms of the partial derivatives of q
j , j = 1, . . . ,N
with respect to the state variables:
µ jq =
1
q j
∑
i
∂ q j
∂ v i
µiv +
1
2
∑
i 6=k
∂ 2q j
∂ v i∂ vk
σN
2 +
1
2
∑
i
∂ 2q j
∂ v i 2

σ i
2 +σN 2
 , (2.34)
and
σ j iq =
1
q j
∂ q j
∂ v i
σ i , i = 1, . . . ,N − 1,
σ j Nq =− 1q j
N−1∑
i=1
∂ q j
∂ v i
σN , (2.35)
where the summations are from 1 to N − 1, since we have only N − 1 state vari-
ables (vNt ≡ 0,∀t ). In the Markov equilibrium that we are looking for, prices q j , j =
1, . . . ,N are functions of the state variables v i , i = 1, . . . ,N − 1. Therefore, we can
apply Ito’s Lemma using the law of motion of the state variables described in (2.23)
to obtain (2.34)–(2.35). Combining (2.34)–(2.35) with (2.9)–(2.10) yields expressions
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for µk and σk in terms of the partial derivatives of q
j , j = 1, . . . ,N with respect to the
state variables, that can be used in (2.33) to form a system of PDEs.
In addition, the market portfolio ωm is given in terms of the state variables and
prices in (2.32), and the composition of the benchmark portfolio ωb is determined
exogenously (it depends on prices as well).
If interest rate is given exogenously, the system of N PDEs in (2.33) can be solved
numerically as described in Appendix 2.6.2 to find N unknown functions q j , j =
1, . . . ,N in terms of the state variables, which then can be used to compute all other
desired equilibrium quantities.
If the risk-free rate is endogenous and risk-free asset is in zero net supply, the sum
of the market value of all firms should be equal to the aggregate wealth in the economy,
i.e. wt =
∑
j q
j
t k
j
t . Dividing this equation by k
N
t and using (2.30) we obtain
D (ψt )
β
=
∑
j
q jt ψ
j
t . (2.36)
We can solve the system of N PDEs in (2.33) together with Equation (2.36) to find
N functions q j , j = 1, . . . ,N and interest rate r in terms of the state variables. The
details of the numerical solution are described in the next section.
Numerical Algorithm
To solve for the infinite-horizon equilibrium numerically, I use the explicit 4-step
Runge-Kutta method expounded below. The goal is to find functions q j
 
v1, . . . , vN−1

,
j = 1, . . . ,N , where v i , i = 1, . . . ,N − 1 are state variables as defined in (2.22). All
other desired values can be recovered from these functions. The problem is solved
numerically by adding time dimension t .
The state variables and t are discretised with step sizes equal to d v i = 0.02, and
d t = 0.01. Since v i ∈ (−∞,+∞) , i = 1, . . . ,N − 1, I impose upper and lower limits
on the values of v i s. Adding the time dimension, Ito’s Lemma implies that the q -drifts
change to
µ˜ jq =µ
j
q + u j , j = 1, . . . ,N ,
where
u j =
q˙ j
q j
, j = 1, . . . ,N , (2.37)
µ jq is the drift from the original problem given by (2.34) without the time derivative,
and q˙ j is the derivative of q j with respect to time. Incorporating this change in (2.9)
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means that the drift of capital µ jk should also alter to
µ˜ jk =µ
j
k + u
j , j = 1, . . . ,N ,
whereµ jk is the drift from the original problem given by (2.9) without the time deriva-
tive. In vector notation we can write
µ˜k =µk + u,
where u is the vector of scaled time derivatives with elements specified in (2.37) and
µk is the vector of drifts from the original problem without the time derivatives.
Let’s call the function of interest f (v, t )where f can be q j , j = 1, . . . ,N . We begin
with some terminal values, that is f (v,T ) for all values of v in the grid (more details
on the choice of terminal values below) and move backwards in time as described
further below by computing f (v,T − d t ), f (v,T − 2d t ), and so on until the time
derivatives vanish, i.e. until u j converges to zero for all j = 1, . . . ,N .
At each point in time, having q j , j = 1, . . . ,N , I use the finite difference method
to approximate first- and second-order derivatives of f with respect to v, i.e. fi (v, t ),
fi i (v, t ), and fi k (v, t ) for i , k = 1, . . . ,N − 1. Having the prices and their derivatives,
we can compute µk , σk , and ωm for all values of the state variables following the
procedure described in the previous section.
Since the modified problem contains the time dimension, µk should be replaced
with µ˜k in the system of PDEs (2.33), so it becomes
µ˜k =Σ (ωm −τωb )+ r 1. (2.38)
If interest rate r is exogenously given and is known, the next step which is com-
puting the time derivatives is easily done by inverting (2.38) to find u according to
u =Σ (ωm −τωb )+ r 1−µk . (2.39)
If interest rate is endogenous, I differentiate both sides of the condition (2.36) with
respect to t to get∑
j
B j u j = 0. (2.40)
where B j , j = 1, . . . ,N , are defined as
B j = q
jψ j

β+
d i
d q j

.
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Combining (2.39) and (2.40), we can find r as
r =−
∑
j B
j F j∑
j B j
, (2.41)
where F j is j -th element of vector Σ (ωm −τωb )−µk . Substituting (2.41) in (2.39)
yields the vector of time derivatives u.
Having computed the time derivatives for all values of v in the grid, we can take a
step back in time and compute new values for q j , j = 1, . . . ,N . Formally, let the time
derivative computed in (2.39) be
f˙ = g (v, t , f ) ,
where f can be q j , j = 1, . . . ,N , and function g (.) is the corresponding time derivative
from (2.39). Then we take a step of size d t back according to
f (v, t − d t ) = f (v, t )− g (v, t , f )d t , ∀v. (2.42)
Equation (2.42) corresponds to the Euler method for solving differential equations.
For better convergence properties, instead of (2.42), I use a 4-step Runge-Kutta method
(RK4). Intuitively, instead of taking a step back of size d t , I only step back a fraction
of that, recompute the time derivatives at that step and use it to take another frac-
tional step, and so on through the 4 steps of RK4. Formally, we move back in time
according to
f (v, t − d t ) = f (v, t )− d t
6
(k1 + 2k2 + 2k3 + k4) ∀v,
where
k1 = g (v, t , f ),
k2 = g (v, t − d t2 , f −
d t
2
k1),
k3 = g (v, t − d t2 , f −
d t
2
k2),
k4 = g (v, t − d t , f − (d t )k3).
We repeat this process until time derivatives converge to zero, which means that
the solution found satisfies the infinite-horizon problem. The solution will converge
to the stationary solution for a wide range of terminal values at t = T , as long as these
values satisfy the market clearing conditions.
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Stationary Distribution
Let’s restate the dynamics of the state variable given by (2.23) as
d vt =µv d t +σ
′
v dZt .
If a stationary distribution, limt→∞ f (v, t ) = f (v) exists, it satisfies the following
differential equation
0 =− d
d v
[µv f (v)]+
1
2
d 2
d v2

σ2v f (v)

, (2.43)
which is known as Kolmogorov Forward Equation. In case of multivariate state vari-
able the multidimensional analogue of (2.43) should be used.
To derive the stationary distribution, differential equation (2.43) is solved numer-
ically by adding a time dimension. If the distribution is a function of time, the Kol-
mogorov Forward Equation becomes
∂ f
∂ t
=− ∂
∂ v
[µv f (v, t )]+
1
2
∂ 2
∂ v2

σ2v f (v, t )

. (2.44)
We start from an initial guess distribution and solve forward until the time derivative
converges to zero, which means that the solution satisfies (2.43) and therefore is a
stationary distribution.
2.6.3 Partial Delegation
Households decide how much to invest in the fund and how much to consume
max
ct ,xt
E
ˆ ∞
0
e−βt log (ct )d t

,
s.t.
d wt
wt
= xt d Rt +(1− xt ) rt d t − ctwt d t . (2.45)
Because of logarithmic utility, the value function of the representative household is
of the form
V h =
1
β
log (w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
J h (w)
+H h ,
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where H h depends only on aggregate state. HJB equation is
max
c ,x
DV h + log (c)−βV h = 0,
whereD is the Dynkin operator.7 The optimal fraction of wealth invested in the fund
the and optimal consumption are given by
argmax
c ,x
DV h + log (c) = argmax
c ,x
DJ h + log (c) .
Since J h (w) = 1β log (w), we can use Itos Lemma and the law of motion of w in
(2.45), substituting d Rt from (2.17) to obtain
DJ h = 1
β

x z ′ (µk − r 1)+ r − cw −
1
2
x2z ′σ ′kσk z

.
Taking first-order condition of DJ h with respect to x yields the following optimal
portfolio
xt =
zt
′  µk ,t − rt 1
zt ′Σt zt
, (2.46)
where Σt = σk ,t
′σk ,t . Optimal consumption is given by c =βw as before. It can be
easily shown that if there is no benchmarking, i.e. τ = 0, then xt = 1, meaning that
households invest all their wealth in the fund. That’s because absent benchmarking,
fund managers invest exactly the same way as households would have done them-
selves.
Although households’ decision affects the total amount of money invested in the
stock market, it does not affect the portfolio allocation within the risky assets dispro-
portionately, because the decision on how to allocate funds to different stocks is taken
by fund managers who behave as before.
2.6.4 Index Inclusion Data
The index inclusion events data is taken from Jeffrey Wurgler website. the data is used
and described in Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002). The data includes both additions
and deletions but I only consider additions because most deletions are related to cor-
porate events such as takeover. I have excluded inclusions around which a corporate
event such as merger or takeover, spin-offs or divestiture had taken place (these events
are recorded in Wurgler’s data).
This data is merged with the Compustat data to track investment and capital lev-
els around the inclusion event. Quarterly investment amount (I = iK) is computed
7The Dynkin operator is the drift term of a process S, when applying Ito’s Lemma to derive d S.
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from the cumulative capital expenditure (CAPXY). Replacement value of capital (K)
is computed using the perpetual inventory method as described in Whited (1992) from
the gross capital stock (PPEGTQ). The investment rate i is the total quarterly invest-
ment I divided by the replacement value of capital K . I have only kept events for
which the data is fully available around a window of 10 quarters before and after the
event with no missing values in investment and gross capital levels. As a result there
are 103 unique events in the data during years 1986–2000.
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Chapter 3
A Production Economy with
Heterogeneous Beliefs
Abstract
This article examines balance sheet recessions in a general equilibrium model when
agents have heterogeneous beliefs about future technology growth. I show a channel
which describes the risk concentration through belief dispersion rather than ad-hoc
constraints on aggregate risk sharing, which is the case in most macro models with fi-
nancial frictions. Endogenous stochastic consumption volatility arises from constant
fundamental volatility, and prices and investment are stochastic even with static dis-
agreement. Recursive preferences allow me to disentangle the role of risk aversion
and elasticity of intertemporal substitution in the model. I study the role of static
vis-à-vis dynamic disagreement and examine the effect of financing constraints on the
equilibrium when there is belief dispersion among agents. In my model financing
constraints have an ambiguous effect on the equilibrium risk sharing. In some re-
gions they mitigate the endogenous risk and diminish the balance sheet channel by
limiting the concentration of the aggregate risk while in others they have the opposite
effect.
3.1 Introduction
The seminal works of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999) and more
recent papers by Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) and He and Krishnamurthy
(2012), among others, have highlighted the role of the financial sector in amplify-
ing and propagating shocks to the economy and generating balance sheet recessions.
Some agents in the economy lever up and hold a higher fraction of aggregate risk.
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Shocks to the economy erode their net worth and depress asset prices, reducing the
funding capacity and aggravating financial frictions, which in turn deepen and pro-
long the initial slump. While the role of balance sheets in an economy with financial
frictions is well studied, the reason why aggregate risk is so concentrated in the first
place is less clear. Di Tella (2012) shows that if contracts on aggregate state of the econ-
omy are introduced in standard models of balance sheet recessions, the balance sheet
channel disappears. Such contracts sever the link between leverage and risk sharing,
and are easy to implement using standard financial instruments. In this paper I show
a channel which generates risk concentration via heterogeneous beliefs rather than
ad-hoc constraints on aggregate risk sharing, and I demonstrate that a nonlinear re-
lationship between financial variables and real investment need not be the result of
financial frictions. I study the role of static vis-à-vis dynamic disagreement and also
examine the effect of financing constraints on the equilibrium when there is belief
dispersion among agents.
There are two groups of agents in my model that have heterogeneous beliefs about
the future path of technology growth. I abstract from any other heterogeneity to
focus on belief dispersion, hence agents are otherwise identical. In particular, un-
like Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke et al. (1999), Brunnermeier and Sannikov
(2014), He and Krishnamurthy (2012), and many other models that study balance
sheet recessions, the two groups have the same productive technology. At each point
in time agents in the two groups have the same productivity level, but they project
different paths for future levels. In the baseline model, the disagreement is modelled
as dogmatic, time-invariant subjective beliefs. A static disagreement is enough to in-
duce stochastic dynamics in investment opportunities, prices, and investment, be-
cause of the dynamics of wealth distribution among agents which is irrelevant in a
homogeneous-belief economy. The model is later extended to cases with time-varying
disagreement which adds further dynamics to the economic activity. The extension
with time-varying disagreement can accommodate two channels for belief dispersion:
(i) different subjective priors as in Basak (2000) or Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006); and (ii)
different subjective models as in David (2008), Dumas et al. (2009), and Whelan (2014).
In all cases agents have the same information set, but agree to disagree how to process
information, which is represented by different filtrations.
Belief dispersion motivates trade in the model. Agents who are optimistic about
future technology growth are the natural buyers of capital; they apply leverage to hold
more capital relative to their wealth and have large exposure to the aggregate risk.
This capital allocation profile generates endogenous volatility in the economy which
affects the real sector via volatile investment, prices and interest rate. Although the
fundamental volatility is constant, aggregate consumption exhibits stochastic volatil-
ity which is induced by belief dispersion.
When natural buyers are well capitalised, they are able to absorb most of the risk
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in the economy and this regime would comprise normal times in the model. Negative
shocks however can erode their wealth and weaken their balance sheets so that they
are not able to hold as much capital as they would in normal times. As a result,
asset prices drop and risk premia rise to induce the pessimist agents to hold the assets.
Lower prices in turn reduce investment and deepen the recession.
This paper predominantly is related to two strands of literature. First and fore-
most, it relates to the literature on balance sheet channel for business cycles and builds
on the idea that adverse price movements affect the borrowers net worth. Many pa-
pers in this tradition focus on the role of financial constraints and build on the semi-
nal works of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), and Bernanke
et al. (1999) who studied financial frictions in infinite-horizon macro settings. These
classic examples study how financial frictions amplify (unanticipated) shocks near the
steady state using log-linear approximation. Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) and
He and Krishnamurthy (2012) study the full dynamics in continuous time with an-
ticipated shocks. The intuition behind my research is in spirit similar to the one in
Geanakoplos (2010) who examines the role of heterogeneous beliefs in creating lever-
age cycles. In a two-period exchange economy, he illustrates how the identity of the
marginal buyer affects prices in the economy. Instead I study a fully dynamic model
in a continuous-time setup with production.
In recent macro-finance papers, like Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) and He
and Krishnamurthy (2012), the driving force is a constraint on raising equity for ex-
perts. Experts have to hold (at least) a pre-specified share of the risk on their balance
sheet. A feature of these models is that, as long as the equity constraint is not bind-
ing, there is no role for the debt market. Debt financing only arises in the constrained
region, when firms cannot raise equity any more. To address that, He and Krishna-
murthy (2013) impose an ad-hoc assumption that a fraction of households can only
invest in debt market. In Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), the economy is always
constrained (no equity issuance allowed at all). This counterfactual feature does not
arise in my setting. In the baseline model there are no constraints on financing and
firms can raise debt or equity. However, since agents disagree about the prospects of
the economy, they would not invest in the equity of agents in the other belief group
and the introduction of constraint on raising equity would not change the equilib-
rium. Introducing other financing restrictions into the model such as short-selling
ban and leverage cap can indeed curb the level of endogenous risk in this model, there-
fore although the channel in which balance sheet plays a role is different from models
with financial frictions, introducing frictions can interact with this channel.
My paper is also motivated by the consumption-based asset pricing literature that
studies the role of heterogeneous agents in general, and heterogeneous beliefs in par-
ticular in generating trade in financial markets and aims to expand this framework
to link it with real economic activity and show how it can explain economic fluctu-
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ations. While in the consumption-based asset pricing literature the level of aggregate
consumption is a given exogenous process, in this research aggregate production, in-
vestment and consumption are all endogenous equilibrium outcomes. I borrow most
of the modeling apparatus from this literature. A few examples of related papers in
this literature are Dumas (1989), Bhamra and Uppal (2009), Basak and Pavlova (2013),
Chabakauri (2013). In these papers, agents have different risk aversions, and Sharpe
ratios and volatilities change with changes in wealth distribution. Basak (2005) and
Chabakauri (2014) investigate the asset-pricing implications of models where agents
have heterogeneous beliefs. David (2008) shows that disagreement can describe the
equity premium with low risk aversion. Bhamra and Uppal (2014) solve for asset
prices with heterogeneous preferences and beliefs. Borovicˇka (2013) studies survival
and long-run dynamics when agents have heterogeneous beliefs and recursive prefer-
ences. Similarly, Kogan et al. (2006) study the survival of agents when traders have
erroneous beliefs.
All of these papers are set up in a Lucas economy with a given aggregate consump-
tion stream with constant volatility. I use the insight developed in this literature and
implement it in a production economy, hence I am able to discuss features like invest-
ment and endogenous production and consumption growth. As a result, in my model
aggregate consumption, growth rates, and investment exhibit stochastic volatility en-
dogenously. As illustrated by the long-run risk literature following Bansal and Yaron
(2004), consumption stochastic volatility can explain a high and time-varying equity
premium. In my model an endogenous stochastic volatility arises from constant fun-
damentals.
The closest paper in spirit to my research is Baker et al. (2014), who also study
heterogeneous beliefs in a production economy. My paper is different to theirs in four
different ways. First, I model belief dispersion in a different and more empirically-
relevant way.1 Second, they use CRRA preferences in their model and therefore they
cannot differentiate risk aversion from elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS).
As a result, to avoid counterfactual results for prices and investment, they focus on
risk-aversion coefficient less than one. On the contrary, I use Epstein-Zin preferences
to separate the effects of risk aversion and EIS. While they only study dogmatic beliefs,
I study the model when disagreement is dynamic in the extension. Finally, I also study
the model when there are financing constraints, namely short-selling and leverage
constraints.
In terms of the modeling and solution methodology my paper is similar to Di Tella
(2012) who studies the effect of uncertainty shocks. In a setting akin to Brunnermeier
and Sannikov (2014) he shows that when agents are allowed to write contracts on the
1They model heterogeneous beliefs as disagreement about the depreciation rate of capital. However, at
least in empirical asset pricing literature calibrations, there is little disagreement about proper values for
the depreciation rate. In my model belief dispersion is about how technology evolves over time.
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aggregate state of the economy, the balance sheet channel vanishes, but if uncertainty
shocks hit the economy, they can drive this channel, therefore the type of aggregate
shock can explain the concentration of aggregate risk.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 3.2, I describe the base-
line model. Section 3.3 solves for the equilibrium in the baseline case and explores
its properties. Section 3.4 extends the model to include financial frictions. Dynamic
disagreement is studied in Section 3.5, and Section 3.6 concludes. Proofs, details of
derivations, complete solutions and numerical method are provided in the Appen-
dices.
3.2 The Baseline Model
There are two groups of agents in the economy, a continuum one of each. Agents
within each group are identical and the wealth distribution among them is irrelevant,
therefore I represent each group with a representative agent indexed with j = A,B .
They are identical except that they have different beliefs about the uncertainty in the
economy. There is a perishable consumption good from which agents obtain utility.
The consumption good is taken as numeraire. There are two assets, a productive
asset called capital (risky) and a risk-free asset. The capital stock is endogenous with
dynamics described below, and the risk-free asset is in zero net supply. Capital can
be used to produce consumption good, and consumption good can be invested to
accumulate capital. Both groups can hold capital and produce output with the same
productivity.
The model closely follows Di Tella (2012) and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014).
Unlike these two papers, agents in my model have the same productivity level, and in
the baseline case they face no financial constraints. Instead agents have heterogeneous
beliefs about the future productivity growth.
3.2.1 Technology and Belief Dispersion
Consider representative agent j = A,B with capital holding k jt , where t ∈ [0,∞) is
time. The agent can use capital to produce flow of output at rate
y jt = at k
j
t
per unit of time, where at is the current level of productivity in the economy. I model
the belief dispersion as different beliefs about the evolution of the technology. Agents
j = A,B have their own probability spaces

Ω,
¦F jt © ,P j  , and believe that technol-
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ogy will evolve according to this law of motion
dat
at
=µ ja,t d t +σa dZ
j
t , j = A,B , (3.1)
where Z j is a standard Brownian motion under agent j ’s subjective probability mea-
sure P j , µ ja,t is the agent j ’s subjective belief about technology growth rate, and σa is
the constant volatility of productivity growth process, on which agents concur. The
true dynamics of the productivity growth under the objective probability measure P
is
dat
at
=µa,t d t +σa dZt , (3.2)
where Z is a Brownian motion under the objective probability space denoted by
(Ω,{Ft } ,P).
Since agents should agree on observables in general and on the productivity growth
dat/at in particular, the innovation processes dZ
j
t , j = A,B are linked via
dZBt = dZ
A
t +φt d t , (3.3)
where
φt =
 
µAa,t −µBa,t

/σa (3.4)
is dubbed the disagreement process. In the baseline model I assume that µa,t = µa is
a constant and agents A and B have dogmatic beliefs µAa and µ
B
a about this parameter,
which they do not update. This simplification is not crucial and is later relaxed to
accommodate more general cases. The underlying intuition and mechanism carries
over to the general case. Furthermore, I assume that µa lies between both investors’
beliefs in this fashion
µBa <µa <µ
A
a ,
therefore agent A is more optimistic about the future than agent B , and the disagree-
ment process is φt =φ> 0.
Agents can invest the consumption good to accumulate capital. If representative
agent j = A,B invests at i jt rate per efficiency unit of capital (i.e. i
j
t at per unit of
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capital), the capital stock held by her evolves according to
d k jt
k jt
=

Φ

i jt
−δd t , (3.5)
where δ is the depreciation rate and Φ (.) reflects the cost of investment. Φ (.) is an
investment function with adjustment costs, such that Φ(0) = 0, Φ′ > 0, and Φ′′ < 0,
and i jt is the investment rate per efficiency unit of capital. The concavity of Φ re-
flects decreasing returns to scale, and for negative values of investment, corresponds
to technological illiquidity. An agent needs to invest at the rate of i jt at k
j
t to accumu-
late capital at rate

Φ

i jt
−δk jt . This formulation which is similar to Adrian and
Boyarchenko (2012) implies that the costs of adjusting capital are higher when tech-
nology is more advanced, reflecting the intuition that more developed economies are
more specialised and higher technology levels require more investment to acquire and
to maintain.
3.2.2 Asset Markets
Agents can trade in two assets, the risk-free asset in zero net supply with instantaneous
rate of return of rt , and capital which is risky and has endogenous supply.
Agents trade capital in the competitive market and the price of capital per effi-
ciency unit is denoted by pt . Therefore agents can trade capital at rate pt at . Both
prices p and r are determined in equilibrium. I postulate the following endogenous
Ito process for pt
d pt
pt
=µ jp,t d t +σp,t dZ
j
t , j = A,B . (3.6)
Since agents must agree on the prices, the difference in price drifts is given by
µAp,t −µBp,t = σp,tφt . (3.7)
Because the price of capital is volatile, holding capital is risky. If an agent holds
k jt units of capital and invests i
j
t per efficiency unit of capital, the value of her capital
holding is pt at k
j
t , which using Ito’s Lemma evolves according to
d

pt at k
j
t

pt at k
j
t
=

Φ

i jt
−δ +µ jp,t +µ ja,t +σaσp,td t+σa +σp,tdZ jt , j = A,B .
(3.8)
Since capital is a productive asset, her capital holding generates a dividend yield as
well. Given the capital and investment levels, her total production rate is at k
j
t , and
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production rate net of investment is at k
j
t − i jt at k jt . Therefore the dividend yield from
holding capital is
at k
j
t − i jt at k jt
pt at k
j
t
=

1− i jt

/pt . (3.9)
Combining the returns from the capital gains and the dividend yield, the total returns
from holding capital can be summarised as
d rk ,t =µ
j
k ,t d t +σt dZ
j
t , j = A,B , (3.10)
where µ jk ,t is the instantaneous expected return on capital under the subjective mea-
sure of agents
µ jk ,t ≡ E jt

d rk ,t/d t

(3.11)
=

1− i jt

pt
+Φ

i jt
−δ +µ jp,t +µ ja,t +σaσp,t , j = A,B ,
and σt is the instantaneous volatility of the return on capital
σt ≡ E jt

d r 2k ,t/d t
1/2
= σa +σp,t . (3.12)
The difference in the drifts is derived from (3.4) and (3.7) to be
µAk ,t −µBk ,t = σtφt . (3.13)
The volatility term in (3.10) represents the total risk from holding the risky asset.
It has two components, σa the fundamental risk, and σp,t the endogenous risk. The
fundamental component is assumed to be constant, but the endogenous component
is time-varying. As the distribution of wealth across agents changes through time, the
endogenous risk varies.
Although agents have different probability measures and process information dif-
ferently, they must agree on observables and conditions (3.3), (3.4), (3.7), and (3.13)
ensure that their beliefs are consistent. We can summarise these consistency conditions
in the following relationship
µAk ,t −µBk ,t
σt
=
µAp,t −µBp,t
σp,t
=
µAa,t −µBa,t
σa
≡φt . (3.14)
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3.2.3 Agents’ Problem
If representative agent j = A,B with wealth w jt invests a fraction x
j
t of her wealth in
capital, and 1− x jt in the risk-free asset, and consumes at rate c jt , her wealth evolves
according to
d w jt
w jt
= x jt d rk ,t +

1− x jt

rt d t − c
j
t
w jt
d t
=

rt + x
j
t

µ jk ,t − rt
− c jt
w jt

d t + x jt σt dZ
j
t , (3.15)
where the second line follows from (3.10). The portfolio choice of agents can be
viewed as a choice about how much risk they want to take. Investing a fraction x jt of
wealth in capital results in wealth volatility equal to x jt σt . Hence, we can rewrite the
wealth dynamics in terms of
σ jw,t = x
j
t σt , (3.16)
i.e. the exposure of agent j to aggregate risk. Using the new choice variable σ jw,t and
defining the price of risk under agents’ subjective measures as
pi jt =
µ jk ,t − rt
σt
, (3.17)
we can rewrite the wealth dynamics (3.15) as
d w jt
w jt
=

rt +σ
j
w,tpi
j
t − cˆ jt

d t +σ jw,t dZ
j
t , (3.18)
where cˆ jt = c
j
t /w
j
t is the consumption-wealth ratio of agent j . An agent earns risk-
free rate rt plus a premium pi
j
t for each unit of exposure to the aggregate risk that
she chooses to take on. Nevertheless, agents disagree about the price of risk in the
economy and this disagreement leads to disproportionate risk sharing. Consistency
condition (3.14) implies that the disagreement about the risk premium is
piAt −piBt =φt . (3.19)
All agents have Epstein-Zin preferences with the same discount rate ρ, risk aver-
sion γ , and elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) ψ−1.2 Agent j = A,B faces
2For more information see Duffie and Epstein (1992).
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the following problem
max
cˆ jt ,σ
j
w,t ,i
j
t
U j ,
subject to the solvency constraint w jt ≥ 0, and the dynamic budget constraint (3.18).
Utility U j is defined recursively as
U jt =E jt
 ∞ˆ
t
f (cu , Uu )d u
 ,
where
f (c , U ) =
1
1−ψ
 ρc1−ψ((1− γ )U ) γ−ψ1−γ −ρ (1− γ )U
 .
3.2.4 Equilibrium
Given that the wealth distribution within each group is irrelevant and agents within
each group behave similarly, I present the equilibrium conditions in terms of variables
for representative agents A and B .
For any given initial condition on the aggregate capital stock K0 and its distribu-
tion among agents
¦
k j0 > 0 : j = A,B
©
such that
∑
j=A,B k
j
0 = K0, an equilibrium is
described by a set of stochastic processes: the price of capital per efficiency unit p, in-
terest rate r , wealth processes

w j ≥ 0	, capital holdings k j	, investment decisions
i j
	
, and consumption choices

c j
	
of agents j = A,B such that
1. initial wealth satisfy w j0 = p0a0k
j
0 ,
2. each agent solves her problem, taking prices as given, and
3. markets for consumption good and capital clear, i.e.,
∑
j=A,B
c jt =
∑
j=A,B
at k
j
t

1− i jt

, (3.20)∑
j=A,B
k jt = Kt , (3.21)
where
dKt =
 ∑
j=A,B

Φ

i jt
−δk jt !d t .
Market clearing for the risk-free asset follows from Walras’ Law.
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3.3 Solving the Baseline Model
The solution methodology in this section closely follows Di Tella (2012). In the base-
line model, the disagreement is static and there are no funding constraints. Even a
static disagreement is enough to induce stochastic dynamics in investment opportu-
nities, prices, and investment and portfolio decisions by agents. These dynamics are
described by how wealth is distributed among the two groups, and a single state vari-
able defined as
st =
wAt
wAt + wBt
,
which is the share of wealth of representative agent A, is enough to portray the state
of the economy. In Section 3.3.4, it is shown that the equilibrium conditions above
can be restated in terms of st , and hence it is enough to describe the system in terms
of it. Since the technology is linear in capital, the economy is scale-invariant and we
can abstract from the level of capital stock. I solve for the equilibrium by solving the
agents’ optimisation problem and imposing market-clearing conditions and I look
for a Markov equilibrium with state variable st . When we allow for time-varying
disagreement, a second state variable is required.
The state variable st can be interpreted in terms of the strength of agent A balance
sheet relative to agent B . In an economy with homogeneous beliefs, st will be constant
and there is no balance sheet channel. With belief dispersion risk will be concentrated
on the balance sheet of optimists and negative shocks reduces their share of wealth,
generating volatility in prices and investment.
For consistency, I write down the equilibrium dynamics mostly under the subjec-
tive measure of representative agent A, which is called measure A. It is easy to change
the measure to the objective measure or the subjective measure of agent B (measure
B) using the relevant consistency condition.
I employ the dynamic programming approach to solve the agents’ problem. I
conjecture that the value functions have the following form
V At =
 
ξt w
A
t
1−γ
1− γ ,
for agent A, and
V Bt =
 
ζt w
B
t
1−γ
1− γ ,
for agent B . The processes ξt and ζt are wealth multipliers for agents A and B and cap-
ture the forward looking stochastic investment opportunities that agents face. For a
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given level of wealth, agents can attain higher utility with when ξt or ζt are larger,
therefore these quantities capture how attractive investment opportunities are. I as-
sume the following dynamics for these processes that need to be derived endogenously
in equilibrium
dξt
ξt
=µξ ,t d t +σξ ,t dZ
A
t ,
dζt
ζt
=µζ ,t d t +σζ ,t dZ
B
t .
Notice that the dynamics for the wealth multipliers are written under each agent’s
respective probability measure.
To characterise the equilibrium, first I solve for all the equilibrium outcome vari-
ables in terms of p, ξ , and ζ (and their derivatives with respect to st ), which in turn
are functions of the state variable themselves, i.e.
pt = p (st ) , ξt = ξ (st ) , ζt = ζ (st ) ,
and are conjectured to be twice continuously differentiable. Because p, ξ , and ζ are
functions of st , their dynamics are linked to the law of motion of st by Ito’s Lemma
as described in Appendix 3.7.5. Once these functions and the law of motion of st are
determined, σp ,σξ ,σζ ,µp ,µξ , andµζ are all known functions of st as well. Finally, I
derive a system of differential equations for p, ξ , and ζ by imposing the equilibrium
conditions. This system is solved numerically to find p, ξ , and ζ , which are used to
compute all other desired equilibrium quantities.
The rest of this section is laid out as follows. First I describe the agents’ problem
in terms of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. These equations are then used to
pin down agents’ optimal choices of investment, consumption and portfolio in terms
of p, ξ , and ζ . Next the law of motion of st is derived and the equilibrium is restated
in terms of a Markov equilibrium, and the conditions are rewritten in terms of st .
Combining these conditions with agents’ optimal choices, I discuss the properties of
the equilibrium, in particular capital holdings and risk sharing, and compare it with
a homogeneous-belief benchmark.
3.3.1 Agents’ HJB Equations
We can use the conjectured value function to derive the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation for each agent. Agents A and B solve the following HJB equations respec-
tively
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ρ1−ψ = maxcˆA,σAw ,iA

 
cˆA
1−ψ
1−ψ ρξ
ψ−1 + r +σAwpiA− cˆA +µξ − γ2

σAw
2
+σ2ξ − 2
1− γ
γ
σAwσξ
 , (3.22)
ρ
1−ψ = maxcˆB ,σBw ,iB
( 
cˆB
1−ψ
1−ψ ρζ
ψ−1 + r +σBwpiB − cˆB +µζ − γ2
 
σBw
2 +σ2ζ − 2 1− γγ σBwσζ
)
. (3.23)
3.3.2 Investment Choice
Investment shows up in agents’ HJB equation only through the instantaneous ex-
pected return on capital (3.11) (through the risk premiums pi j , j = A,B). Every agent
who holds capital chooses investment to maximise the instantaneous expected return
on capital. Therefore, optimal investment per efficiency unit of capital solves
max
i
(1− i)
pt
+Φ (i) .
This objective pins down the investment choice at each moment in the following way
Φ
′
(i) =
1
pt
.
This condition shows that investment solely depends on the current price of capital
per efficiency unit, and agents show the same investment behaviour, i.e.,
iAt = i
B
t = i (pt ) . (3.24)
In addition, higher prices lead to more investment because
i
′
(p) = − 1
Φ′′ (i (p))
1
p2
= −Φ
′ (i)2
Φ′′ (i)
> 0. (3.25)
The optimal investment rule (3.24) is incorporated in the expressions for return on
capital d rk ,t hereafter.
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3.3.3 Consumption Choice
The first-order conditions of the HJB equations (3.22) and (3.23) pin down the agents’
consumption choices
cˆAt = ρ
1
ψ ξ
− 1−ψψ
t , (3.26)
cˆBt = ρ
1
ψ ζ
− 1−ψψ
t . (3.27)
If the elasticity of intertemporal substitution ψ−1 > 1, agents increase their con-
sumption relative to their wealth when investment opportunities are low and vice
versa (the substitution effect dominates). On the other hand, EIS< 1 means that the
consumption-wealth ratio is increasing in the investment opportunities (the income
effect dominates).
Before proceeding to the portfolio choice problem of agents, I review the equilib-
rium concept in the next section.
3.3.4 Equilibrium Revisited
In this section the equilibrium is restated in terms of a Markov equilibrium, and the
conditions are rewritten in terms of st . First I characterise the law of motion of st =
wAt /
 
wAt + w
B
t

in the following Lemma using the agents dynamic budget constraints.
Lemma 1. The equilibrium law of motion of st under probability measure A is
d st
st
=µAs ,t d t +σs ,t dZ
A
t , (3.28)
where
µAs ,t = σ
A
w,tpi
A
t −σt
 
piAt +σ
A
w,t

+σ2t +(1− st )
 
cˆBt − cˆAt

,
and
σs ,t = σ
A
w,t −σt
= σAw,t −

σa +σp,t

.
Proof: See Appendix 3.7.2.
Next, I redefine the equilibrium conditions in terms of a Markov equilibrium. For
brevity, subscript t is dropped from most of the variables hereafter. I have already
imbedded the optimal investment choice of agents in the definition below and I have
used the fact that investment is only a function of the price of capital. We are looking
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for a Markov equilibrium which is a set of functions p, ξ , and ζ in s and policy
functions cˆ j ,σ jw , i j , j = A,B , such that
1. the policy functions are optimal given the HJB equations (3.22) and (3.23), and
ξ and ζ satisfy the HJB equations,
2. the consumption good market clears according to
s cˆA +(1− s) cˆB = 1− i (p)
p
, (3.29)
3. the capital market clears according to
sσAw +(1− s)σBw = σa +σp , (3.30)
4. the law of motion of s satisfies (3.28).
Technology and capital levels can be recovered from (3.1) and (3.5). Interest rate r and
market prices of risk pi j , j = A,B are functions of p, ξ , and ζ . The market clearing
conditions (3.29) and (3.30) are derived in Appendix 3.7.3.
3.3.5 Capital Holdings and Risk Sharing
The portfolio choice of agents is pinned down by the first-order condition of their
HJB equations. The exposure of representative agent A is given by
σAw =
piA
γ
− γ − 1
γ
σξ . (3.31)
The first term in (3.31) represents the myopic demand and the second term is driven
by the hedging motive due to the stochastic investment opportunities. A risk-averse
agent prefers to have more wealth when ξt is low to smooth her utility, while a risk-
neutral agent prefers higher wealth when ξt is high to achieve a higher level of ex-
pected utility. Agent B follows a similar rule to choose her exposure
σBw =
piB
γ
− γ − 1
γ
σζ . (3.32)
Disproportionate risk sharing between the two groups generates the balance sheet
channel. Using (3.31), (3.32), and (3.19) we obtain an expression for the difference
between the risk exposures of agents A and B
σAw −σBw = φγ +∆, (3.33)
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where ∆ is the relative hedging motive of agents defined as
∆≡−γ − 1
γ
 
σξ −σζ

. (3.34)
The difference in risk exposures has two components. The first component, φ/γ , is
a positive constant in the baseline model. According to our assumption, agent A is
more optimistic about the risk and she attaches a higher risk-premia to the risky asset.
Therefore her myopic demand is always larger than the myopic demand of agent B .
The second component is the relative hedging motive of agents, ∆, which is itself
induced by the disagreement and risk aversion and is therefore dynamic.
We can link the strength of the agent A balance sheet to the difference in the risk
exposures (3.33). From Lemma 1, we know that σs ,t = σ
A
w,t − σt . We can use the
capital market clearing condition (3.30) and the definition of σt in (3.12) to rewrite
this as
σs = σ
A
w −
 
sσAw +(1− s)σBw

= (1− s)  σAw −σBw .
Using (3.33) we obtain
σs = (1− s)

φ
γ
+∆

. (3.35)
In equilibrium, ξ and ζ are functions of s , therefore the relative hedging motive is
itself a function of σs by Ito’s Lemma (see Appendix 3.7.5 for the details). Ultimately
we obtain
σs =
(1− s) φγ
1+ s (1− s) γ−1γ  ξsξ − ζsζ  . (3.36)
Since s is the state variable, its dynamics drives all other stochastic variables. In
Section 3.2.2 total risk in the economy σt is decomposed into two components of fun-
damental and endogenous risks. The fundamental component σa is constant. Using
(3.36) and Ito’s Lemma, the endogenous component is
σp =
ps
p
sσs
=
s (1− s) psp φγ
1+ s (1− s) γ−1γ  ξsξ − ζsζ  . (3.37)
The foremost contributor to price volatility is the disagreement. Under the condi-
tions discussed below, it is going to generate a positive price volatility that amplifies
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the fundamental risk. The risk-aversion parameter γ on the other hand has a damp-
ening effect on the balance sheet channel. If the agents are very risk averse, they do
not over-expose themselves to the risky asset as much, even if they are very optimistic
about it. Finally the sign of price derivative with respect to s determines the sign
of σp . It turns out that the sign of ps depends on EIS parameter ψ
−1. If EIS > 1,
ps is positive and price is increasing in group A share of wealth s , because the natural
buyers cut investment and consume more with weak balance sheets and high risk pre-
mium. With EIS < 1, the ps would be negative and price volatility would diminish
the fundamental risk. If CRRA preferences were used instead of EZ, risk aversion
and EIS were tangled and could not be separately studied. This is the reason why
Baker et al. (2014) focus only on the risk-aversion parameter less than one, otherwise
balance sheet channel has a dampening rather than amplifying effect. I can allow for
γ > 1 case, which is the empirically relevant case, without hampering the balance
sheet channel due to using EZ preferences.
Figure 3.1 illustrates how risk aversion γ and EIS ψ−1 affect the equilibrium risk
sharing. In the baseline case (blue solid line), both risk aversion and EIS are bigger
than one. The red dash-dotted line depicts the equilibrium quantities when γ < 1 and
EIS > 1, the green dashed line when γ > 1 and EIS < 1, and the black dotted line
when both γ < 1 and EIS < 1. In all cases σs > 0, so negative shocks to technology
growth decreases the share of wealth of optimists (natural buyers). In other words, the
inherent interpretation of the model is that lower values of s (when natural buyers are
poorly capitalised) correspond to slumps while higher values comprise normal times
and booms. Negative technology shocks not only weaken optimists’ balance sheet
and reduce their share of wealth, but also increase its volatility.
As Figure 3.1 shows, to rule out unrealistic price changes during downturns, EIS
needs to be greater than 1. If EIS > 1, intertemporal substitution effect dominates
and agents cut back on investment in the asset market and increase their consumption
when investment opportunities are low, therefore price of capital and investment fall
down in a slump, as expected. But when EIS< 1, the price of capital and investment
in capital both increase in a downturn. In other words in this case a negative shock
to technology, increases the price of the productive asset, dampening the effect of the
original shock (σp < 0) instead of amplifying it (σp > 0).
Figure 3.1 also depicts the relative hedging motive of agents, ∆, under different
scenarios. From (3.33) we know that ∆ is one of the components of the difference
in the risk exposures. The other component, φ/γ , is decreasing in risk aversion and
is higher when agents are less risk averse. On the other hand, γ has a different effect
on the relative hedging motive. When γ < 1, the relative hedging motive is negative
and reduces the difference in the risk exposures. When γ > 1, agents are more risk
averse, and the relative hedging motive is positive and increases the difference. As
evident from the σs plot, overall the direct effect of γ is greater than the indirect
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effect through the hedging motive.
Figure 3.2 shows how equilibrium outcomes change with the disagreement φ.
The curves with red dash-dotted line have higher disagreement (by reducing the fun-
damental volatility) relative to the ones with solid blue line. As a result, the relative
hedging motive, price volatility, state variable volatility, optimists fraction of wealth
invested in capital (or leverage, xA), the interest rate, the price of capital and invest-
ment increase and risk premium decreases.
3.3.6 Benchmark with Homogeneous Beliefs
If agents have homogeneous beliefs (φ = 0), the balance sheet channel vanishes. In
Equation (3.35) both the direct effect via φ itself, and the indirect channel via the
hedging motives disappear. The price is constant, and there is a balanced growth path
in which the economy grows at a constant rate. Price is a fixed point in the following
relationship
p =
1− i (p)
ρ− (1−ψ)  Φ (i (p))−δ +µa − γ2σ2a  , (3.38)
where µa is the consensus technology growth rate. For the derivation and the regu-
larity conditions under which this solution is admissible, see Appendix 3.7.4.
3.4 Financing Constraints
In this section I examine the model when financing constraints are introduced. In the
baseline model there are no constraints on financing and firms can raise debt or equity.
However, since agents disagree about the prospects of the economy, they would not
invest in the equity of agents in the other group. Therefore introducing a constraint
on raising equity would not change the equilibrium studied in the previous section
and I focus on two other restrictions.
The first constraint is the short-selling restriction. If agents are pessimist enough
about the risky asset, they may want to short sell it in the baseline model and depend-
ing on the parameter values, short-selling can occur in equilibrium. Since this paper
deals with physical capital first and foremost, it is natural to think that short selling
may be infeasible. While I study cases both with and without short selling, similar pa-
pers like Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) and Di Tella (2012) rule out short-selling
altogether, and Baker et al. (2014) do not consider the model with constraints at all.
The short-selling constraint only affects the pessimists’ problem (group B). There
cannot be an equilibrium where the optimists also want to sell the capital short, since
capital is in positive supply. Group B agents solve their HJB equation (3.23) subject to
the non-negativity constraint σBw,t ≥ 0. As a result, optimal exposure to risk changes
94
from (3.32) to
σBw =
piB
γ
− γ − 1
γ
σζ +
λB
γ
, (3.39)
where λB ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier of the non-negativity constraint. When the
constraint is not binding, λB is zero and the portfolio choice is unrestricted. If the sum
of the myopic and hedging demands is negative, the agent stays out of the market for
the risky asset such that σBw = 0 and λ
B > 0. In this case the entire capital stock is held
by optimists. This change in the portfolio choice affects the aggregate risk sharing
and as a result the volatility of the state variable changes to
σs = (1− s)

φ−λB
γ
+∆

, (3.40)
where∆ is the relative hedging motive defined in (3.34). The short-selling restriction
has two effects on σs . Since λ
B ≥ 0, comparing (3.40) with (3.35) shows the fact
that short-selling constraint limits the concentration of the risk on optimists’ balance
sheet and dampens the balance sheet channel. This is the direct channel. On the other
hand, there is an indirect channel through the relative hedging term ∆. Importantly,
the direct channel is active only when the constraint binds, but the indirect effect also
exists in the range where the constraint does not bind. The overall effect is ambiguous
as I illustrate later.
The second type of constraint that I consider is the leverage constraint. This re-
striction may be imposed by regulators or can arise endogenously if agents are subject
to idiosyncratic discontinuous shocks. Agents’ leverage (the ratio of their asset hold-
ing to their wealth) cannot exceed a certain threshold. This restriction only affects the
optimists’ problem (group A). They want to borrow from the other group to hold
more assets than their wealth, and this constraint limits their ability to do so. On the
other hand, pessimists never hold more assets than their wealth and are net lenders,
so they are unaffected by the leverage restriction. Group A agents solve their HJB
equation (3.22) subject to the leverage constraint σAw,t ≤ σt/θ, where θ ∈ (0,1) is a
constant. Due to (3.16), this restriction is equivalent to xAt ≤ 1/θ, i.e. a constraint on
the fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset (e.g. θ = 1/3 means that agents can-
not invest more than three times their wealth in the risky asset). As a result, optimal
exposure to risk changes from (3.31) to
σAw =
piA
γ
− γ − 1
γ
σξ − λ
A
γ
. (3.41)
where λA ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier of the leverage constraint. When the con-
straint is not binding, λA is zero and the portfolio choice is unrestricted. If the sum of
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the myopic and hedging demands exceeds the leverage threshold, then λA is positive
and leverage will be bound at σAw = σt/θ. In this case agent A holds less capital than
she wishes to do and part of the capital stock is offloaded to agent B . This change in
the portfolio choice affects the aggregate risk sharing and as a result the volatility of
the state variable changes to
σs = (1− s)

φ−λA
γ
+∆

. (3.42)
Similar to the previous case, there can be two effects. Since λA≥ 0, comparing (3.42)
with (3.35) shows that the leverage constraint also limits the concentration of the risk
on optimists’ balance sheet and dampens the balance sheet channel. This is the direct
channel. On the other hand, there is an indirect channel through the relative hedging
term∆. The direct channel is active only when the constraint binds, but the indirect
effect also exists in the range where the constraint does not bind.
Figure 3.3 compares the solution in the baseline case to a model where both restric-
tions are active. For a range of the domain of the state variable s , these restrictions
have anticipated effects from their direct channel, i.e. endogenous volatility is de-
creased and the balance sheet channel dampened. However there is another range of
intermediate values, where in fact the indirect channel through the hedging motives
dominates. In this region risk is more concentrated on optimists’ balance sheet than
the benchmark case, and endogenous volatility and the volatility of s are higher.
To summarise, unlike the macro models with financial constrains like Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997), Bernanke et al. (1999), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), and He
and Krishnamurthy (2012), in this model financing restrictions can have ambiguous
effects. In some regions they mitigate the endogenous risk and diminish the balance
sheet channel by limiting the concentration of the aggregate risk while in others they
have the opposite effect. For a full characterisation of the solution with financing
constraints, see Appendix 3.7.6.
3.5 Dynamic Disagreement
In this section the baseline model is extended to the cases with time-varying disagree-
ment. The extension with time-varying disagreement can accommodate two channels
for belief dispersion: (i) different subjective priors with updating as in Basak (2000)
or Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006); and (ii) different subjective models as in David (2008),
Dumas et al. (2009), and Whelan (2014). In all cases agents have the same information
set, but agree to disagree about how to process information, which is represented by
different filtrations.
In the first case, agents start from different subjective priors about µa which they
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update through time in a Bayesian fashion, and therefore their disagreement changes
with time. In the second case agents can have disagreement about the correct model
of the technology growth dynamics, and they can learn about it from the realised
technology process.
In either case, the disagreement process is stochastic. Let’s assume it has the fol-
lowing law of motion under measure A
dφt =µφ,t d t +σφ,t dZ
A
t . (3.43)
The terms µφ,t and σφ,t depend on the particular channel for belief dispersion and
the specifics of the information environment.3 Here I abstract from those specifics
and assume that the disagreement dynamics are exogenously given by (3.43).
When the disagreement is time-varying, we need another state variables to char-
acterise the Markov equilibrium, the disagreement φt . Therefore we need to find
functions p, ξ , and ζ such that
pt = p (φt , st ) , ξt = ξ (φt , st ) , ζt = ζ (φt , st ) ,
which are conjectured to be twice-continuously differentiable. The solution approach
is very similar to the baseline model, save for the fact that p, ξ , and ζ are now func-
tions of two variables. Agents’ HJB equations remain the same as before, and optimal
investment and consumption choices do not change. Capital and consumption good
market clearing conditions stay unchanged as well. Agents optimal risk exposures
will still be (3.31) and (3.32), and hence aggregate risk sharing rule is given by (3.35),
i.e.
σs = (1− s)

φ
γ
+∆

,
where ∆ = − γ−1γ
 
σξ −σζ

. Because ξ and ζ are now multivariate functions, the
relative hedging motive term now has two components, a part driven by the wealth
distribution dynamics (as before), and a part driven by changes in the disagreement
(new). Formally, I derive expressions for σξ and σζ using Ito’s Lemma (provided in
Appendix 3.7.7), from which I obtain the following expression for the relative hedging
3In one such specification for example is similar to Whelan (2014), where agents agree on the long run
technology growth rate, but have subjective beliefs on the persistence of the growth rate shocks.
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motive term
∆=−γ − 1
γ


ξs
ξ
− ζs
ζ

sσs︸ ︷︷ ︸
endogenous
+

ξφ
ξ
− ζφ
ζ

σφ︸ ︷︷ ︸
exogenous
 . (3.44)
The first term is endogenous with respect to the wealth distribution, and the second
term is exogenous. Because of the endogenous term, there is a feedback between the
relative hedging motive term and the aggregate risk-sharing rule. Plugging (3.44) into
the expression for σs and solving for it explicitly, we obtain the following expression
for the volatility of the agent A wealth ratio which is analogous to (3.36) in the baseline
model
σs =
(1− s)

static︷︸︸︷
φ
γ
dynamic︷ ︸︸ ︷
−

γ − 1
γ
ξφ
ξ
− ζφ
ζ

σφ

1+ s (1− s) γ−1γ  ξsξ − ζsζ  . (3.45)
The disagreement now contributes to the disproportionate risk sharing in two chan-
nels: the static effect as the baseline model and the dynamic effect due to time-variation
in the disagreement which affects the relative investment opportunity sets and hedg-
ing motives. The risk-sharing rule in the baseline model (3.36) only contains the static
effect φ/γ .
Empirical evidence and economic intuition tells us that uncertainty and belief dis-
persion increase during economic downturns. Baker et al. (2013), among others, pro-
vide evidence for this claim. In the model, this phenomenon corresponds to σφ ≤ 0.
A negative shock to technology growth decreases optimists’ share of wealth and in-
creases the disagreement φt , which increases σs and endogenous volatility σp , ampli-
fies the effects of the original shock and worsens risk-sharing. Therefore, the dynamic
effect of belief dispersion provides further amplification mechanism for the balance
sheet channel in addition to the baseline static effect.
With the new expression for σs in (3.45), the rest of the solution is similar to the
baseline model, aside from the drift termsµp ,µξ , andµζ that should change to reflect
that p, ξ , and ζ are functions of φ as well. Expressions for the new drifts plus the
modifications to the numerical solution are provided in Appendix 3.7.7.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this paper I examine balance sheet recessions in a general equilibrium model when
agents have heterogeneous beliefs. Agents have different subjective beliefs about the
future technology growth rate. I show a channel which describes the risk concentra-
tion via heterogeneous beliefs rather than ad-hoc constraints on aggregate risk sharing,
and I demonstrate that the nonlinear relationship between financial variables and real
investment need not be the result of financial frictions. In my model aggregate con-
sumption, growth rates, and investment exhibit stochastic volatility endogenously,
and endogenous stochastic consumption volatility arises from constant fundamen-
tal volatility. Even with static disagreement, prices and investment opportunities are
stochastic.
In addition, I examine the effect of financing constraints on the equilibrium when
there is belief dispersion among agents. In my model financing constraints have an
ambiguous effect on the equilibrium risk sharing. In some regions they mitigate the
endogenous risk and diminish the balance sheet channel by limiting the concentration
of the aggregate risk while in others they have the opposite effect. Finally I extend the
model to accommodate dynamic belief dispersion in a general way to accommodate
different cases.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Figures
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Figure 3.1: The price of capital p, investment i , interest rate r , volatility of s , σs , log of
the investment opportunities ratio log (ξ /ζ ), relative hedging motive ∆, price volatility σp ,
market price of risk (as perceived by agent A) piA, and agent A’s fraction of wealth invested in
capital xA, for various combinations of γ and ψ−1. γ = 3 and ψ−1 = 1.5: solid blue, γ = 0.9
and ψ−1 = 1.5: dash-dotted red, γ = 3 and ψ−1 = 2/3: dashed green, γ = 0.9 and ψ−1 = 2/3:
dotted black.
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Figure 3.2: The price of capital p, investment i , interest rate r , volatility of s , σs , log of
the investment opportunities ratio log (ξ /ζ ), relative hedging motive ∆, price volatility σp ,
market price of risk (as perceived by agent A) piA, and agent A’s fraction of wealth invested in
capital xA, for φ= 0.2: solid blue, and φ= 0.42: dash-dotted red.
101
0 0.5 1
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
s
p
0 0.5 1
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
s
i
(p
)
0 0.5 1
0.04
0.045
0.05
0.055
0.06
0.065
0.07
0.075
0.08
0.085
s
r
0 0.5 1
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
s
σ
s
0 0.5 1
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
s
lo
g
(ξ
/
ζ
)
0 0.5 1
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
s
∆
0 0.5 1
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
0.012
0.014
s
σ
p
0 0.5 1
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
s
pi
A
0 0.5 1
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
s
x
A
Figure 3.3: The price of capital p, investment i , interest rate r , volatility of s , σs , log of the
investment opportunities ratio log (ξ /ζ ), relative hedging motive∆, price volatilityσp , market
price of risk (as perceived by agent A) piA, and agent A’s fraction of wealth invested in capital
xA, for unrestricted model: solid blue, and restricted model (both short-selling and leverage
constraints with θ= 1/2): dash-dotted red.
102
3.7.2 Proof of Lemma 1
We can use (3.3) to rewrite the wealth dynamics of agent B in (3.18) under measure A
d wBt
wBt
=
 
rt +σ
B
w,tpi
B
t − cˆBt +σBw,tφt

d t +σBw,t dZ
A
t ,
=
 
rt +σ
B
w,tpi
A
t − cˆBt

d t +σBw,t dZ
A
t ,
where the second line follows from (3.19). Combining this law of motion with the
wealth dynamics of agent A in (3.18) using Ito’s Lemma, the law of motion of the total
wealth in the economy is
d
 
wAt + w
B
t

wAt + wBt
=
 
rt +pi
A
t
 
stσ
A
w,t +(1− st )σBw,t
−  st cˆAt +(1− st ) cˆBt d t +σt dZAt ,
=

rt +σtpi
A
t − 1− i (pt )pt

d t +σt dZ
A
t ,
where the second line follows from the goods and capital market clearing conditions
(3.29) and (3.30). Since st = w
A
t /
 
wAt + w
B
t

, and we have the law of motion of wAt
and wAt + w
B
t separately, we can employ Ito’s Lemma again to get the desired result
stated in Lemma 1.
3.7.3 Derivation of the Market Clearing Conditions (3.29) and
(3.30)
According to (3.24), agents invest at the same rate, which only depends on prices,
therefore the right-hand side of equation (3.20) becomes
at (1− i (pt ))
∑
j=A,B
k jt = at (1− i (pt ))Kt .
In the left-hand side, I substitute c jt with w
j
t cˆ
j
t , and then divide both sides by the total
wealth in the economy. Since the risk-free asset is in zero net supply, the aggregate
wealth in the economy is equal to the aggregate value of capital, i.e.
wAt + w
B
t = pt at Kt . (3.46)
Hence, dividing both sides of by pt at Kt , leads to (3.29).
For the capital market clearing, first from Section 3.2.3, remember that x jt is the
fraction of wealth of agent j invested in capital. Hence the money invested by agent
j in capital is x jt w
j
t and the capital holding is
k jt =
x jt w
j
t
pt at
.
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Therefore, we can rewrite the capital market clearing condition in (3.21) as
xAt w
A
t
pt at
+
xBt w
B
t
pt at
= Kt
⇒ st xAt +(1− st ) xBt = 1, (3.47)
where I have used (3.46), and the definition of st . The last step is to multiply both
sides of (3.47) by σt = σa +σp,t , which results in equation (3.30).
3.7.4 Derivation of the Homogeneous-Belief Price
Equation (3.36) hints that in the absence of disagreement, σs ,t = 0,∀t , and the share
of wealth of agents remains constant through time at initial values. Consequently, p,
ξ , and ζ are constants with no dynamics (zero drifts and volatilities). Investment per
efficiency unit of capital is constant and identical for agents and is equal to i (p) accord-
ing to (3.24). Moreover, agents face the same investment opportunity set, therefore
ξ = ζ , which together with (3.26), (3.27), and (3.29) means that consumption wealth
ratio for agents is
cˆA = cˆB = ρ
1
ψ ξ −
1−ψ
ψ =
1− i (p)
p
.
Agents choose their portfolios similarly, and since there are no hedging motives, ex-
posure to risk is
σAw = σ
B
w =
pi
γ
= σa ,
where the last equality follows from the capital market clearing condition (3.30). As
a result, the market price of risk is pi= γσa , which along with (3.17) and (3.11) yields
this expression for the interest rate
r =
1− i (p)
p
+Φ (i (p))−δ +µa − γσ2a .
Finally we can substitute the above quantities in the agents’ HJB equations (3.22) and
(3.23) (which are now identical) to arrive at the equation (3.38) which implicitly de-
fines the price.
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3.7.5 Solving for the Equilibrium
In this section, I derive a system of differential equations for p, ξ , and ζ by imposing
the equilibrium conditions. This system is solved numerically to find these functions,
which are used to compute all other desired equilibrium quantities.
I start from Equation (3.36) which provides a solution for σs . Because p, ξ , and
ζ are functions of st , their volatilities are linked to σs by Ito’s Lemma according to
σp =
ps
p
sσs ,
σξ =
ξs
ξ
sσs ,
σζ =
ζs
ζ
sσs . (3.48)
Lemma 1 implies agent A’s exposure to risk is σAw = σs +σa +σp , which can be used
to determine her perceived market price of risk
piA = γσAw +(γ − 1)σξ ,
using (3.31). Agent B ’s perceived risk premium is linked to piA by the consistency
condition piB =piA−φ, which I use to derive σBw from (3.32)
σBw =
piB
γ
− γ − 1
γ
σζ .
Next, I determine µs from Lemma 1
µs = σ
A
wpi
A− σa +σp piA +σAw+ σa +σp2 +(1− s)  cˆB − cˆA .
The drift terms µp , µξ , and µζ are given by Ito’s Lemma
µp =
ps
p
sµs +
1
2
ps s
p
s2σ2s ,
µξ =
ξs
ξ
sµs +
1
2
ξs s
ξ
s2σ2s ,
µζ =
ζs
ζ
s (µs −σsφ)+ 12
ζs s
ζ
s2σ2s . (3.49)
Note that I have dropped the superscript from the drifts, but it should be remembered
that all drifts are written under measure A, except µζ which is under measure B (this
point is valid throughout this section).
The expression for the interest rate is obtained from agent B ’s HJB (3.23), where
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cˆB is replaced from (3.27)
r =
ρ
1−ψ−
ψ
1−ψρ
1
ψ ζ −
1−ψ
ψ −σBwpiB−µζ + γ2
 
σBw
2 +σ2ζ − 21− γγ σBwσζ

. (3.50)
We obtain two second-order differential equations in p, ξ , and ζ by plugging the
terms provided above in
(1− i (p))
p
+Φ (i (p))−δ +µp +µAa +σaσp − r =

σa +σp

piA, (3.51)
and
ρ
1−ψ =
ψ
1−ψρ
1
ψ ξ −
1−ψ
ψ + r +σAwpi
A+µξ − γ2
 
σAw
2 +σ2ξ − 21− γγ σAwσξ

, (3.52)
where the first expression follows from the definition of the market price of risk in
(3.17) together with (3.11) and (3.12), and the second one follows from (3.22) replacing
cˆA from (3.26). Finally, replacing cˆA and cˆB from (3.26) and (3.27) in the goods market
clearing condition (3.29), we get
ρ
1
ψ

ξ −
1−ψ
ψ s + ζ −
1−ψ
ψ (1− s)

=
1− i (p)
p
, (3.53)
which along with the two differential equations characterise the equilibrium. This
system is solved numerically with details described below.
Numerical Algorithm
To solve for the infinite-horizon equilibrium numerically, I use the explicit 4-step
Runge-Kutta method expounded below. The ultimate goal is to find three functions
functions p (s), ξ (s), and ζ (s), where s ∈ (0,1) is the state variable.4 All other desired
values can be recovered from these functions. The problem is solved numerically
by adding time dimension t . Both s and t are discretised with step sizes equal to
d s = 0.001 and d t = 0.001.5 Adding the time dimension, Ito’s Lemma implies that
the drifts of these three variables change to
µ˜p =µp +
p˙
p
, µ˜ξ =µξ +
ξ˙
ξ
, µ˜ζ =µζ +
ζ˙
ζ
,
4The solution for s = 0 and s = 1 is provided in the Appendix for Boundary Conditions.
5For some specifications the size of the time step is changed to d t = 0.0005 for the algorithm to con-
verge.
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where the terms in red are derivatives with respect to time and µp , µξ and µζ are
given by (3.49).
Let’s call the function of interest f (s , t ) where f can be p, ξ , or ζ . We begin
with some terminal values, that is f (s ,T ) for all values of s in the grid (more details
on the choice of terminal values below) and move backwards in time as described
further below by computing f (s ,T − d t ), f (s ,T − 2d t ), and so on until the time
derivatives vanish. I use the finite difference method to approximate first- and second-
order derivatives of f with respect to s , i.e. fs (s , t ) and fs s (s , t ), ∀s .6 Having p, ξ ,
and ζ and their s -derivatives, consumption-wealth ratios cˆA and cˆB are given by (3.26)
and (3.27), and σs is computed from (3.36), using which we are able to compute σp ,
σξ , and σζ from (3.48). Next, values of σ
A
w , pi
A, piB , σBw , µs , µp , µξ , and µζ are
computed following the procedure described in the previous section.
Since the modified problem contains the time dimension, µξ and µζ should be
replaced with µ˜ξ and µ˜ζ in the agents’ HJB equations (3.22) and (3.23). Consequently,
we obtain the following expression from agent B’s HJB (3.23) for the new interest rate
r˜ = r − ζ˙
ζ
,
where r is the interest rate from the original problem without the time derivative
given by (3.50). Plugging r˜ and µ˜ξ into agent A’s HJB (3.22), we obtain
ζ˙
ζ
− ξ˙
ξ
=− ρ
1−ψ +
ψ
1−ψρ
1
ψ ξ −
1−ψ
ψ + r +σAwpi
A +µξ
− γ
2
 
σAw
2 +σ2ξ − 21− γγ σAwσξ

≡ F1. (3.54)
Similarly, we should modify (3.51) by replacingµp and r with µ˜p and r˜ , which yields
p˙
p
+
ζ˙
ζ
=−

(1− i (p))
p
+Φ (i (p))−δ +µp +µAa +σaσp − r −

σa +σp

piA

≡ F2. (3.55)
Finally, I differentiate both sides of the goods market clearing condition (3.53) with
6The derivatives are approximated by
fs (s , t )≈ f (s + d s , t )− f (s − d s , t )2d s , fs s (s , t )≈
f (s + d s , t )− 2 f (s , t )+ f (s − d s , t )
d s2
.
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respect to t to get
B1
p˙
p
= B2
ξ˙
ξ
+B3
ζ˙
ζ
, (3.56)
where B1, B2, and B3 are defined as
B1 ≡ i (p)− i
′ (p) p − 1
p
,
B2 ≡

1− 1
ψ

s cˆA,
B3 ≡

1− 1
ψ

(1− s) cˆB .
For each value of s in the discretised grid, Equations (3.54), (3.55), and (3.56) pro-
vide three equations to find the three time derivatives. The solution to this system
is
ζ˙
ζ
=
B1F2 +B2F1
B1 +B2 +B3
ξ˙
ξ
=
ζ˙
ζ
− F1,
p˙
p
= F2− ζ˙ζ . (3.57)
Having computed the time derivatives for all values of s in the grid, we can take
a step back in time and compute new values for p, ξ , and ζ . Formally, let the time
derivative computed in (3.57) be
f˙ = g (s , t , f ) ,
where f can be p, ξ , or ζ , and function g (.) is the corresponding time derivative
from (3.57). Then we take a step of size d t back according to
f (s , t − d t ) = f (s , t )− g (s , t , f )d t ∀s . (3.58)
Equation (3.58) corresponds to the Euler method for solving differential equations.
For better convergence properties, instead of (3.58), I use a 4-step Runge–Kutta method
(RK4). Intuitively, instead of taking a step back of size d t , I only step back a fraction
of that, recompute the time derivatives at that step and use it to take another frac-
tional step, and so on through the 4 steps of RK4. Formally, we move back in time
according to
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f (s , t − d t ) = f (s , t )− d t
6
(k1 + 2k2 + 2k3 + k4) ∀s ,
where
k1 = g (s , t , f ),
k2 = g (s , t − d t2 , f −
d t
2
k1),
k3 = g (s , t − d t2 , f −
d t
2
k2),
k4 = g (s , t − d t , f − (d t )k3).
We repeat this process until time derivatives converge to zero, which means that
the solution found satisfies the infinite-horizon problem. The solution will converge
to the stationary solution for a wide range of terminal values at t = T , as long as
these values satisfy the goods market clearing condition. I set the terminal conditions
at values such that the consumption-wealth ratios for agents are the same and equal to
some arbitrary number and the corresponding market-clearing price.
Derivation of the Boundary Conditions
This section addresses the equilibrium solution when the share of wealth of either
group goes to zero, i.e. at the boundary values s ∈ {0,1}. The solution is very similar
to the benchmark case with homogeneous beliefs, because at the boundaries the entire
wealth is held by agents with the same beliefs, and the other group has no wealth.
When s → 1, the aggregate wealth is held by group A agents. As argued in Ap-
pendix 3.7.4, σs = 0 when s = 1, and as a result
σp = σξ = σζ = 0,
µp =µξ =µζ = 0.
From (3.26) and (3.29) we obtain the consumption-wealth ratio for agent A
cˆA = ρ
1
ψ ξ −
1−ψ
ψ =
1− i (p)
p
,
which also provides an expression for ξ . Capital market clearing condition (3.30)
shows that the total risk in the economy is absorbed by agent A, i.e.
σAw =
piA
γ
= σa ,
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which means that piA = γσa . Reasoning similar to Appendix 3.7.4 provides the ex-
pression for the interest rate using (3.23)
r =
1− i (p)
p
+Φ (i (p))−δ +µAa − γσ2a .
Finally we can substitute the above quantities in HJB equation (3.22) to derive
p =
1− i (p)
ρ− (1−ψ)  Φ (i (p))−δ +µAa − γ2σ2a  ,
which implicitly defines the price. This expression is identical to the homogeneous
belief price (3.38), except that µAa has replaced µa .
Agent B has zero wealth when s = 1, nonetheless we can compute her perceived
price of risk and desired exposure from the equilibrium conditions
piB =piA−φ= γσa −φ,
σBw =
piB
γ
= σa − φγ ,
which I substitute in her HJB equation to find ζ from
ρ
1−ψ =
ψ
1−ψρ
1
ψ ζ −
1−ψ
ψ + r +
1
2γ
(γσa −φ)2 .
The solution at s = 0 is very similar. Again, σs = 0 and therefore p, ξ , and ζ have
zero drifts and volatilities. Consumption-wealth ratio for agent B is
cˆB = ρ
1
ψ ζ −
1−ψ
ψ =
1− i (p)
p
,
which also provides an expression for ζ . She also holds the aggregate capital stock,
therefore
σBw =
piB
γ
= σa ,
which means that piB = γσa . The interest rate is
r =
1− i (p)
p
+Φ (i (p))−δ +µBa − γσ2a ,
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and the price of capital is implicitly defined by
p =
1− i (p)
ρ− (1−ψ)  Φ (i (p))−δ +µBa − γ2σ2a  .
Agent A has zero wealth when s = 0, nevertheless we can compute her perceived
price of risk and desired exposure from the equilibrium conditions
piA =piB +φ= γσa +φ,
σAw =
piA
γ
= σa +
φ
γ
,
which I substitute in her HJB equation to find ξ from
ρ
1−ψ =
ψ
1−ψρ
1
ψ ξ −
1−ψ
ψ + r +
1
2γ
(γσa +φ)
2 .
3.7.6 Solving the Model with Financing Constraints
The Lagrangian for the problem with the short-selling constraint is (optimal invest-
ment already imbedded)
max
cˆB ,σBw
 
cˆB
1−ψ
1−ψ ρζ
ψ−1+ r+σBwpiB− cˆB+µζ − γ2
 
σBw
2 +σ2ζ − 21− γγ σBwσζ

+λBσBw ,
subject to
σBw ≥ 0,
λB ≥ 0,
λBσBw = 0.
From the first-order conditions, optimal consumption-wealth ratio is identical to (3.27),
and optimal exposure to risk is (3.39). Similar to the derivation in Section 3.3.5, we
can obtain (3.40) and consequently
σs =
(1− s) φ−λBγ
1+ s (1− s) γ−1γ  ξsξ − ζsζ  ,
using the new value for σBw . When the short-selling constraint binds, σ
B
w = 0, and the
aggregate risk is concentrated on the balance sheet of agent A, hence
sσAw = σa +σp ,
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which is concluded from (3.30). This condition along with σs = σ
A
w−

σa +σp

from
Lemma 1 and σp =
ps
p sσs from Ito’s Lemma, leads to the following relations for σs
and λB when we are in the constrained region
σs =
(1− s)σa
s

1− (1− s) psp
 ,
λB = (γ − 1)σζ −piB .
In the numerical solution, these conditions are used in the constrained region and the
rest of the solution is similar to the baseline case.
The Lagrangian for the problem with the leverage constraint is (optimal invest-
ment already imbedded)
max
cˆA,σAw
 
cˆA
1−ψ
1−ψ ρξ
ψ−1 + r +σAwpiA− cˆA +µξ − γ2
 
σAw
2 +σ2ξ − 21− γγ σAwσξ

−λA  σAw −σt/θ ,
subject to
σAw ≤ σt/θ,
λA ≥ 0,
λA
 
σAw −σt/θ

= 0.
From the first-order conditions, optimal consumption-wealth ratio is identical to (3.26),
and optimal exposure to risk is (3.41). Similar to the derivation in Section 3.3.5, we
can obtain (3.42) and consequently
σs =
(1− s) φ−λAγ
1+ s (1− s) γ−1γ  ξsξ − ζsζ  .
using the new value for σAw . When the leverage constraint binds, σ
A
w =

σa +σp

/θ,
which together with σs = σ
A
w −

σa +σp

from Lemma 1 and σp =
ps
p sσs from Ito’s
Lemma, results in the following relation for σs
σs =

1
θ − 1

σa
1− s  1θ − 1 psp .
Since in the constrained region σAw =

σa +σp

/θ, the capital market clearing condi-
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tion (3.30) implies that
σBw =
σa +σp
1− s

1− s
θ

,
in this region. Market risk premia for the representative agents are
piB = γσBw +(γ − 1)σζ
piA = piB +φ.
Finally, the Lagrange multiplier λA is
λA =piA− (γ − 1)σξ − γσAw .
In the numerical solution, these conditions are used in the constrained region and the
rest of the solution is similar to the baseline case.
3.7.7 Solving the Model with Dynamic Disagreement
When the disagreement process is time varying and evolves according to (3.43), p, ξ ,
and ζ are multivariate functions, i.e.,
pt = p (st ,φt ) , ξt = ξ (st ,φt ) , ζt = ζ (st ,φt ) ,
thus, Ito’s Lemma indicates that the volatilities and drifts of these functions to follow
σp =
ps
p
sσs +
pφ
p
σφ,
σξ =
ξs
ξ
sσs +
ξφ
ξ
σφ,
σζ =
ζs
ζ
sσs +
ζφ
ζ
σφ,
and
µp =
ps
p
sµs +
pφ
p
µφ+
1
2

ps s
p
s2σ2s + 2
psφ
p
sσsσφ+
pφφ
p
σ2φ

,
µξ =
ξs
ξ
sµs +
ξφ
ξ
µφ+
1
2

ξs s
ξ
s2σ2s + 2
ξsφ
ξ
sσsσφ+
ξφφ
ξ
σ2φ

,
µζ =
ζs
ζ
s (µs −σsφ)+
ζφ
ζ

µφ−σφφ

+
1
2

ζs s
ζ
s2σ2s + 2
ζsφ
ζ
sσsσφ+
ζφφ
ζ
σ2φ

.
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Using the new volatilities and drifts and expression (3.45) for σs in the procedure
described in Appendix 3.7.5 we derive second-order partial differential equations in
p, ξ , and ζ , that can be solved numerically in conjunction with the market-clearing
condition (3.53). The disagreement process moves exogenously according to (3.43).
In the numerical solution the range of possible values forφt needs to be discretised
as well, so we will have a two-dimensional grid of values in (s ,φ). We next follow the
same algorithm described in Appendix 3.7.5 for each point in this grid: add time
dimension to the problem, guess some terminal values, evaluate time derivatives and
move backward in time until the time derivatives converge to zero.
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